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Abstract
Computer networks are now relied on more than ever before for gathering
information and performing essential business functions. In addition, cyber crime is
frequently used as a means of exploiting these networks to obtain useful and private
information.

Although intrusion detection tools are available to assist in detecting

malicious activity within a network, these tools often lack the ability to clearly identify
cyber attacks. This limitation makes the development of effective tools an imperative
task to assist in both detecting and taking action against cyber attacks as they occur. In
developing such tools, reliable test data must be provided that accurately represents the
activities of networks and attackers without the large overhead of setting up physical
networks and cyber attacks. The intent of this thesis is to use operation research and
simulation techniques to provide both data and data-generation tools representative of
real-world computer networks, cyber attacks, and security intrusion detection systems. A
simulation model is developed to represent the structure of networks, the unique details
of network devices, and the aspects of intrusion detection systems used within networks.
The simulation is also capable of generating representative cyber attacks that accurately
portray the capabilities of attackers and the intrusion detection alerts associated with the
attacks. To ensure that the data provided is reliable, the simulation model is verified by
evaluating the structure of the networks, cyber attacks, and sensor alerts, and validated by
evaluating the accuracy of the data generated with respect to what occurs in a real
network. By providing accurate data with respect to network structure, attack structure,
and intrusion detection alerts, the simulation methods used offer considerable support in
developing tools that can accurately detect and take action against attacks.
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1 Introduction
Computer networks have developed significantly over recent years. From college
networks to business networks, nearly all aspects of their functionality have improved
with regard to both speed and capacity. Because of these improvements, increases in the
size and complexity of such networks have been common.

This growing size and

complexity is making the tasks of accurately monitoring network activity and
maintaining all of the desired security standards more difficult for network
administrators.
The reliability that people and organizations expect from networks has also
increased dramatically over recent years. There is an increasing dependence on networks
to store needed information and provide for many of the operations that individuals and
organizations rely on. For some organizations, the information and operations provided
through a network are essential to the functioning of the organization. From banking
firms to communication companies to healthcare, there is a strong dependency on
computer networks to provide the information and functionality that these industries
require (DeLooze, Graig, McKean, and Mostow, 2004).
Due to the large size of, complexity of, and dependency on computer networks,
the security concerns are escalating. Cyber attacks on such computer networks are
becoming more common, and the threats of these attacks increases as organizations
continue to store and access critical information through computer networks. Internetbased attacks especially are a major concern, and they are believed to account for about
70% of all malicious attacks on organizations. Furthermore, the occurrence of internal
and remote attacks is becoming less common due to both the increased internet activity
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that organizations have and the ease of attacking through internet connections. Also, as
traffic increases within the network itself, the specific actions of an attack become further
buried within this traffic (Fuchsberger, 2005).

This can add to the difficulty faced by

administrators and sensing devices in effectively locating these attacks.
Cyber attacks are becoming easier for less-trained hackers due to the abundance
of useful applications and the availability of organization and network-related
information that can be retrieved even from simple Google searches. As organizations
leave sensitive information available to users outside of their network, search engines
such as Google are able to find this information (through the use of bots) and display the
information to any interested hacker that can come up with the proper search criteria
(Kurtz, McClure, and Scambray, 2005). Also, tools and applications used for intrusions
are becoming more powerful, requiring less knowledge from the attackers using them.
For example, password guessing operations that had previously been manual are now
being automated with a variety of tools. Such tools are becoming more available to the
general hacking community, so attackers no longer need to be experts on the subject
matter (Fuchsberger, 2005).
These vulnerable computer networks have not been left defenseless, though.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have taken a role in helping network administrators
find and follow network attacks. Intrusion detection offers a means by which network
traffic can be monitored by a device, or sensor, in addition to being monitored by an
administrator. This is done by the sensor determining if a particular packet of network
traffic could perform or allow for a potentially malicious action. If so, an alert is
generated. An IDS can provide warnings to indicate when malicious or suspicious
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activity is detected, and these warnings can help the system and the administrators defend
against an attack.

Furthermore, an IDS can verify that changes to the security

configurations of a network do in fact provide additional security (Allen, Christie, and
McHugh, 2000). Several different types of intrusion detection systems are available
today, ranging from free open-source software to costly, specialized, and highlyintegrated proprietary systems.
Although sensor alerts do indicate when something suspicious is happening, there
still exists the need for individuals to look through these alerts (or some of these alerts)
and try to determine what is really happening in the network. This process is where the
idea of information fusion has recently been introduced into the cyber domain.
Information fusion is a technique where data from many different sensors is combined
with related databases of information to provide inferences that could not be determined
from looking only at individual sensors (Hall and Llinas, 1998). Multi-sensor data fusion
in the cyber domain is a fairly new concept that involves combining data from multiple
IDS sensors to gain an understanding of network activities and events.

In the cyber

domain, determining the intent and threat of an attacker by looking at actions individually
is a difficult task. Using information fusion as a tool allows for many actions to be
analyzed together to gain a high-level understanding of the current network situation.
The high IDS false-alarm rates (and the problems associated with them) as well as the
lacking ability of most IDSs to gain a full understanding of a network’s current situation
stress the need for improvements in the way these sensor alerts are handled. By utilizing
information fusion techniques, there is potential for a new generation of robust intrusion
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detection systems to be developed that will provide situational information in addition to
the information regarding individual actions (Bass, 2000).
Even with the development of such intrusion detection systems using information
fusion techniques, there is still the difficulty of testing and verifying that the systems
provide the desired accuracy and functionality. Obtaining significant amounts of IDS
sensor data is difficult, and setting up physical networks to perform such tests requires
significant time and money. Also, the variability of networks as well as the value of
information stored on such networks can make the process of accounting for the different
network structures nearly impossible to handle using a physical setup. The development
of intrusion detection systems utilizing information fusion needs to be aided with a
significant amount of reliable data with which to verify and validate the systems’
performance.
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2 Problem and Scope
Providing security in a private network is one of the leading challenges that
organizations are facing with respect to the management of information. Companies
often keep proprietary and personal information stored on a private network, and these
companies do this with the intent of the information only being accessed by reliable
individuals. Frequently, though, hackers (with either individual motives or affiliation
with competing organizations) will find such information of great value and manage to
pry their way into the private network to either obtain or corrupt the desired information.
Most private networks have some form of internet connection, which allows for webbased attacks to be a threat. Hackers will track down such networks and determine the
vulnerabilities and the exploits that will assist them in gaining access into such networks.
Although security measures within private networks are improving, finding all of the
vulnerabilities and keeping the various security measures up to date is a challenging task
for company network administrators, and those planning to attack a private network are
counting on just this. Furthermore, new exploits will always be found before security
measures are made available to deal with them (Kurtz, McClure, and Scambray, 2005).
Due to the difficulty of maintaining security in the world of private networks, the
importance that private networks and the information stored on them have to companies
and organizations around the world, and the frequency at which hackers will attack such
networks to obtain the desirable information, the scope of this research will deal with
security in private networks.
The development of network security tools that make use of information fusion
techniques are a significant step forward in reliably securing a private network.
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However, as noted previously, there is still much to be done in this realm due to the
difficulty of developing robust information fusion systems and verifying that they
accurately recognize attacks. In fusing together information from multiple IDS sensors, a
critical factor is to have an understanding of whether the fusion engine being developed
sufficiently detects the attacks taking place. Attack and sensor data that is provided
during the development stages of information fusion engines can significantly help the
developers confirm their functionality. To verify that attacks are sufficiently detected, a
network could be setup where known attacks are performed and sensors are collecting
related alerts from the actions involved. However, this option creates a substantial
expense for the developers, and such a setup also does not account for the great
variability in the intent and styles of attacks that could possibly occur. For these reasons,
the use of simulation modeling is suggested to accurately portray both the flow of an
attack through a network and the IDS alerts associated with that attack (Holender, Stotz,
and Sudit, 2006). Simulating the attacks and the generation of IDS alerts allows for
significant amounts of attack and sensor related data to be generated quickly with little or
no cost. Furthermore, this simulation will allow for networks of varying sizes and
structures to be easily modeled and used in developing the attack and sensor data. By
providing simulated cyber attack data, information fusion system developers will have
the potential to test their fusion engines across a wide range of scenarios.
A simulation model and methodology has been developed by Kuhl and Kistner
(2005) to provide attack and sensor data for use by fusion engines. This simulation
model allows for varying network sizes and configurations, but there are considerable
limitations in accurately portraying private networks and attacks on those networks. The
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goal of this thesis is to provide a simulation model and methodology that addresses the
limitations and issues with the existing model and improves the accuracy and
performance of the model in generating valid attack and sensor data. This thesis will
expand upon the simulation model developed by Kuhl and Kistner (2005).
There are many important criteria in developing a valid attack simulation model
with high accuracy and strong performance. These, broadly, include allowing attack
scenarios to be run and modified easily, providing significant control of the modeled
network, producing valid and detailed attack and IDS related data, and allowing for
multiple applications in modeling intrusion detection systems. With respect to the ease of
modifying and running scenarios, the simulation model should provide the user with
intuitive controls, give options with regard to how output data should be generated and
dealt with, and graphically display the aspects of the network and the attacks.
Accounting for all of these considerations, there will be less possibility of the resulting
model being improperly used or generating data that the user did not intend to generate.
In providing significant control of the modeled network, the simulation should allow for a
wide spectrum of details to be at the discretion of the user. This includes both the
network topology and the individual device attributes.

For instance, the simulation

should provide the ability to specify the vulnerabilities of a network device that will
reflect what attack actions are available against the device. Also, the simulation should
allow for IDS sensors and IPS tools to be easily added to the network devices. Having
these options will allow the model to better reflect the slight differences that exist
between actual network devices. With respect to producing valid and detailed network
data, the attacks created and the alerts generated should be accurately portrayed. The IDS
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sensor data should be representative of the output that actual sensors provide. The
attacks that the simulator creates should follow a logical attack step progression based on
existing modeled attack templates. To allow for the simulation model to be valuable to
multiple applications in modeling intrusion detection systems, the model should have
parameters setup to handle a variety of user defined information and methods established
by which new (or different) IDS sensors can be added and used in the model.
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3 Background
The methodologies presented in this thesis require an understanding of basic
networking principles. This chapter reviews some of the basic networking principles
referenced in the network and attack simulation methodology to give the reader a clearer
understanding of what is being accomplished. First, an overview of network architecture
is provided in section 3.1. Section 3.2 gives a more detailed description of the network
devices. Section 3.3 describes network packets and presents the functionality of the
packets. Section 3.4 gives an overview of the exploits that hackers used to perform
malicious activity on a network. Lastly, section 3.5 discusses the development of
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and the role these systems play in providing a level of
security in a network.
3.1

Computer Networks
A network generically represents any set of devices that are connected together

through some means in order to communicate and share information. A computer
network focuses on computers being interconnected for this purpose. Networks can range
from a simple single connection between two computers to a vast network of cables and
routers that connect thousands or even millions of computers (such as the Internet). This
networking review, though, will focus specifically on local area networks (LANs) where
all of the network devices are located in roughly the same geographic location. In a
typical LAN, the devices are managed by the same group or company and are connected
at high speeds. This section provides a brief overview of the devices used in a computer
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network, the connections made between these devices, and the typical structure or
topology of LANs (Barrett and King, 2005).
The primary devices in a network are computers. With respect to a company
network, these computers are used to manage data and perform essential and/or beneficial
business functions. For these purposes, two broad categories of computers are used:
servers and clients. A server is a computer specifically designed to store and share
resources among other computers in the network or even in a different network through
connection to the Internet. A client (or host) is a computer that can function individually
or use resources provided by servers. Each computer in a network is provided with a
unique MAC (machine access control) address that is used to reference the computer
(Barrett and King, 2005).
Although direct connections can be made between computers, some additional
network hardware is typically provided to allow multiple (and possibly more complex)
connections to a computer. This hardware is in the form of a routing device, which can be
connected to several machines as well as several other routing devices. Figure 3.1
displays how these routing devices are used to connect computers in a network. In this
figure, both Computer A and Computer B are able to communicate with the fileserver.
Depending on the routing device used, a certain level of functionality will be provided
that can include logic used to manage the communication capabilities and limitations
between computers in the network (Barrett and King, 2005).

10

Figure 3.1: Communication between Multiple Computers
Different types of routing devices include hubs, switches, bridges, and routers.
Hubs provide the least functionality and simply retransmit all received information
through every other connection made with the hub. A bridge is used to send information
between different LANs, and a bridge includes some functionality for identifying the
destination of the information. Switches send information to the specific MAC address
(computer) in the network that the information is intended for. A switch also includes
some functionality to filter out certain types of communications. Routers are used to send
information to a specific computer in the network or to the Internet. A router includes
tables that store which routes can be used in allowing one computer to communicate with
another computer. A router is also integrated with the functionality for filtering out
certain types of communication (Barrett and King, 2005).
Keeping an organized structure for the device connections made within a
computer network is an important part of setting up and managing a network. Computers
with both a similar functionality and physical location are typically connected with the
same routing device. The illustration created by Barrett and King (2005) and displayed in
Figure 3.2 shows a common method used to connect computers in this way (known as a
star topology). In this type of topology, each computer has one segment connected to the
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routing device. With this method, an interruption in one segment will not affect the other
segments. The routing device can then be connected to other routing devices within the
network to provide communication between these computers and another group of
computers (Barrett and King, 2005).

Figure 3.2: A Star Topology for Connecting Computers (Barrett and King, 2005)
Another common approach used in setting up a computer network is to separate
the externally accessed servers from the computers and servers intended for internal
company functions. For example, an organization may have a web server that provides
the company’s website and an FTP server that allows files to be transferred to different
organization locations or even different organizations. These two servers can be kept on a
separate portion of the network in order to provide a more secure setting for the
remaining internal computers and servers. Figure 3.3 displays this type of configuration.
The two external servers are connected to a router that can directly communicate with the
Internet. The remainder of the network is connected to internal routers that provide some
security through the means of firewalls, which will be explained in section 3.2.
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Figure 3.3: Example Network Configuration
3.2

Device Details
Both computers and routing devices have certain characteristics that effectively

guide what type of communication can occur. For computers, such characteristics include
the type of computer, the operating system used on the computer, and the services
running on the computer. For routing devices, the primary characteristic is the set of
firewall permissions. This section provides more details regarding these four device
characteristics.
The type of computer refers to whether the computer represents a host (client) or a
server. Hosts and servers have differences in the way that they communicate, and these
differences need to be recognized and considered when developing communication rules.
The operating system used by the computer indicates the underlying software used to run
applications on the computer. Different operating systems, such as Windows and Linux,
typically use a special set of protocols (or communication mechanisms) to transfer
information. Services represent the specialized software running on a machine to provide
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a particular functionality that is not possible with the operating system alone. These
services help the operating system communicate with applications running on the
computer. For example, an FTP service allows specific files to be uploaded to and
downloaded from a file server. Many services have specific protocols that must be used
in order for communication to occur with the service (Barrett and King, 2005).
The firewall permissions stored on some routing devices indicate what type of
communication is allowed along a certain communication path. Typically, these
permissions are set up to either allow only certain types of communication or block only
certain types of communication. For each specific path through a router, the firewall
permissions will contain a listing of what protocols and computer ports are allowed or
banned. A computer port represents a specific mechanism used to establish a connection
with another computer (or data source). Each computer has thousands of ports that can be
used to establish a communication path. This wide range of ports allows for multiple
communication paths to be established at the same time on a computer. Firewall
permissions are typically setup such that only a small subset of ports is available to be
used. The specific port used in sending a particular piece of information will commonly
depend on the service associated with the information (unless the information is not
associated with a service) (Barrett and King, 2005).

3.3

Network Packets
The components, or devices, within a computer network communicate and send

data through the use of “packets”. Packets contain a pre-defined amount of data with
additional headers that indicate how the data will be handled. Simple communication
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between two machines may only require a single packet while transferring a large file
between two machines may take hundreds of packets. When more than one packet is
used, the data within the packets must be pieced back together to form the original data
stream (file). The packets flowing through a computer network are also referred to as the
network traffic.
The functionality for handling packets in a computer network is provided by a set
of protocols known as TCP/IP. This set has four layers of protocols that are all an
essential part of allowing computers to communicate with each other. A breakdown of
the protocols is shown in Figure 3.4. The lowest (physical) layer is the Ethernet, which
provides the physical connection between computers and the electrical signals that
represent packets. The remaining three layers each have a specific header, or set of
instructions, in the network packets (Crothers, 2003).

Figure 3.4: TCP/IP Protocol Suite
15

The Network layer, using IP and ICMP, provides the routing of the packets,
which is essentially handling how the packets get from the source computer to the
destination computer through the available Ethernet connections in the network. This
layer makes use of the IP addresses of computers in order to route the packets. The IP
header includes the source and destination computer for a particular packet, and each
network linking device (router, hub, etc.) uses this information to send the packet through
the appropriate link in the network (Crothers, 2003).
The transport layer, using the TCP and UDP, provides the packet handling
functionality. This functionality includes breaking a file or stream of data into packets at
the source computer and restructuring or re-ordering the packet data to form a full data
stream at the destination computer. Both TCP and UDP have a wide range of ports that
packets can be sent or received by. Usually, though, a specific set of source and
destination ports (TCP or UDP) is used for a packet relating to the machine service
responsible for the packet. The transport layer header included in the packet indicates
which type of protocol (TCP or UDP) and which port number to use (Crothers, 2003).
The application layer is used to interpret and allocate the data to a specific
machine service and service protocol, such as a web server (HTTP), a mail server
(POP3), a file server (FTP), or some other service. The service can then make use of the
information provided by the packet data. The application layer header indicates which
type of service-specific protocol to use (Crothers, 2003).
At the source computer, the packets are assembled starting with a particular
service. The service pulls together all of the data that needs to be sent, known as the
packet payload, and adds the application layer header. The transport layer then breaks

16

this lumped data into several packets of equal (or near equal) size and includes an
additional header pertaining to the protocol and port combination to use along with the
order of the packets. The network layer adds another header to each packet indicating the
source and destination IP addresses that the packet needs to be routed between. Lastly,
the physical layer provides a dynamic header that indicates the source and destination
MAC addresses for each packet at each link along the path taken, meaning that the header
will change each time the packet moves through a different link (Crothers, 2003).
3.4

Exploits
Exploits represent the actions that hackers perform to attack a network. While an

attack is considered an attempt to bypass some sort of computer security measures, an
exploit is considered a step within an attack used to take advantage of a specific flaw or
vulnerability in the network. An attack can consist of many different exploits performed
in sequence. A successful attack, that violates the security policy of a system, is
considered an intrusion.
Weaknesses in the network that are subject to being exploited are considered
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities commonly exploited by hackers can be broken down into
three categories: development and design problems, management problems, and trust
abuse. Development and design problems refer to software coding errors or architectural
application issues that allow for an application (or the system running the application) to
be used in a means that was not intended. This type of vulnerability is the most
commonly exploited vulnerability in network attacks. Management problems refer to
improper network configurations or policies that allow hackers to gain access to points in
the network believed to be protected. This type of vulnerability is common with
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inexperienced network administrators. Lastly, trust abuse refers to the misuse of
privileges given to an individual. This type of vulnerability requires that the hacker
already has some level of allowed access to the network. Internal-based attacks (as
opposed to internet-based attacks) will commonly exploit the trusted user abilities
(Crothers, 2003).
Both development/design problems and management problems are typically
exploited by breaking (or at least bending) the rules of the TCP/IP protocols. Such
exploits can be in the payload (data) of the packet or in one of the packet headers.
Exploits associated with software (or service) design vulnerabilities tend to either include
malicious code within the packet data or take advantage of the application header and the
application protocols. Exploits associated with the network configuration vulnerabilities
will typically take advantage of the transport layer protocols or the IP layer protocols. For
example, an internet-based hacker can spoof a packet’s source IP using an IP address of
the internal network. This activity effectively takes advantage of the IP layer to make the
packet appear to be coming from a trusted internal source, and the destination computer
will most likely accept the packet data (Crothers, 2003).
3.5

Development of IDS
An intrusion detection system (known as an IDS) offers a way for network

administrators to monitor what type of actions are occurring within a network and
attempt to take action against attempted intrusions (attacks). This system works by
correlating a set of actions with known vulnerability exploits.
The modern techniques used to identify and correlate cyber attacks are significant
improvements over the original techniques. Initially, the only real method to locate
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malicious activity involved a dedicated administrator that would sit in front of a console
and monitor the network activities looking for suspicious actions. The increases in
network size and activity drove this method of detection to become far too difficult for
detecting attacks in real-time. Thus, the use of audit logs became prevalent to keep track
of and store the network activity without the need for individuals to continuously monitor
the activity. This method, though, still resulted in a vast amount of information for
administrators to manually sort through. Often, this information would only be used as a
forensic tool when an actual incident had occurred and the administrators wished to
pinpoint what had caused the incident. Therefore, the method of direct observation and
response has become less effective over time (Kemmer and Vigna, 2002).
As a next step in identifying cyber attacks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
have been developed to automatically detect suspicious-looking network traffic. These
systems offered a relief from the increasing amount of network traffic that needed to be
looked through. Intrusion detection systems (specifically, host-based IDSs) started out
by reviewing audit data as the data was produced in order to provide network
administrators with only information that could potentially be related to an attack, thus
filtering out information regarding the typical, harmless network traffic (Kemmer and
Vigna, 2002). As the IT security industry developed over the years, the use of intrusion
detection systems significantly increased, and the processing rate of these systems
improved as well. Network-based IDSs were introduced to monitor the actual network
traffic instead of the log files produced by a specific host. These systems identify attack
actions by matching attack patterns in the TCP and IP packet stream, and they have a
distinct advantage over host-based IDSs in that they are not associated with a device that
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could potentially be a target itself. As processing power has improved, these systems
have become capable of monitoring the network traffic in “real-time” and triggering
alerts as suspicious activity is identified. Market demands further drive this industry to
develop full-fledged software corresponding to the IDSs, with a wide array of capabilities
in monitoring and organizing the alerts generated by the IDS sensors (Fuchsberger,
2005).
Intrusion detection systems, even with improved accuracy and processing, still
only account for part of the methodology needed to actually defend a network against the
attacks. These systems can determine the cause of an attack (and possibly the intent), but
the IDSs alone do not take the measures to stop such an attack. To perform this function,
intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) have been developed in an attempt to react to the
detected malicious activity. Since these IPSs are actually capable of thwarting some
attacks, the demand for such systems is becoming stronger than the demand for simple
IDSs (Fuchsberger, 2005). However, the majority of current IPSs available do little in
terms of actually identifying an overall attack. Instead, a methodology similar to the
IDSs’ methodology is used where the network traffic is inspected to look at individual
packets and “reflex”-type actions are performed when suspicious activity is identified.
Therefore, many common intrusion prevention systems are really only capable of
reacting to individual attack steps rather than entire attacks.
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4 Literature Review
There are three primary areas of research related to the problem being addressed,
which include the modeling and classification of cyber attacks, the simulating of
computer networks, and the use of information fusion techniques in the cyber domain.
Although there is some overlap between these topics, the combination of all three has
only recently gained attention.

Therefore, there is a great deal of opportunity in

identifying some of the leading issues across these fields and providing a methodology
that effectively addresses these issues. This section reviews some key research that has
already been performed in these fields. Apart from these three areas of research, the
development of object-oriented simulation models is discussed to provide some
preliminary concepts that helps establish an effective object-oriented simulation model
for the modeling required in this thesis. This discussion includes several different
modeling approaches explored by researchers. Also, this section concludes by discussing
both the details and limitations of an existing cyber attack and intrusion detection
simulator developed by Kuhl and Kistner (2005). This existing simulator is important
because the research performed in developing the simulator has served as a basis for the
initial work accomplished by this thesis.
4.1

Modeling and Classification of Cyber Attacks
An effective means to understanding cyber attacks is through classifying the

attacks and modeling the attack progression.

This involves carefully observing the

actions associated with a known attack to gain an understanding of the attacker behavior.
Fortunately, there has been significant progress made in modeling attacks.
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Dougherty and Gonslaves (2006), for instance, developed an adaptive cyberattack modeling system to assist in testing software protection. Previously, a team of
subject matter experts (SMEs) were required to mimic the actions typically associated
with hacker attacks in order to evaluate and validate their software protection
methodology. This method, though, adds significantly to the cost and time required for
such a project, and the method is not really appropriate for the large numbers of scenarios
which need to be thoroughly tested.

The research performed by Dougherty and

Gonslaves found that developing accurate models of cyber attacks had the potential to
substantially reduce the cost and time required. Through this modeling, three primary
categories of attacks were identified: web-based application attacks (considered the most
vulnerable due to the substantial number of tools at the hacker’s discretion), client-server
application attacks, and stand-alone system attacks (which are the hardest to implement).
Also, the models implemented a Bayesian belief network approach to mimic the
reasoning made by hackers. Although the modeling done through this research only
extended to that which was needed for testing the software protection, the methodology is
a good representation of what is becoming necessary for any type of security tools.
Other researchers have looked into modeling attacks by analyzing isolated IDS
alerts associated with attack steps. For example, Cheung, Fong, and Lindqvist (2003)
developed a project called “Correlated Attack Modeling” (CAM) where attack scenarios
are modeled by observing actual IDS alerts. These IDS alerts can generally be associated
with a specific attack step (usually an exploit of some sort). Although this allows for
actual attacks to be used in developing attack patterns, many IDS alerts could be false
positives and thus affect the modeling process. Furthermore, some attack steps may be
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missed altogether or could be temporally distributed enough that piecing together an
attack (let alone add to an attack pattern) becomes a difficult task.
Also, higher-level research has been done to identify the typical sequence of the
different exploits that a hacker can perform.

Holdender, Stotz, and Sudit (2005)

developed a graph-based template that makes use of graph theory techniques to designate
what types of attack actions or exploits are necessary before other certain types can be
performed. This development began by first grouping known exploits into categories or
“stages” based on what type of activity was necessary before these exploits occurred and
what type of activity could be performed afterward. An adjacency matrix was then
developed to correlate the different stages, indicating what stages can occur after an
exploit from a given stage has occurred for all of the stages in the template. A simplified
directed graph of this attack exploit template is displayed in Figure 4.1. The nodes
containing S0 through S9 represent the ten stages of attack exploits, while the edges
(arrows) represent the precedence of stages. For instance, an intrusion-type exploit from
stage 1 (where the attacker gains user access on a device) will only occur after a
reconnaissance-type exploit from stage 0 has been performed (where the attacker obtains
useful information about the device).

By categorizing possible exploits of known

vulnerabilities into one of the stages, the process of modeling an attack becomes
simplified in that only the stages of the attack truly need to be modeled as opposed to the
vast amount of exploits that would need to be considered otherwise. Due to these
advantages, this graph-based template was used in the simulation model developed by
Kistner (2006) to allow for attacks to be automatically simulated based on a set of
parameters.
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Figure 4.1. Directed Graph of Stage Precedence (Holender, Stotz, and Sudit 2005)
4.2

Simulation of Computer Networks
When simulating the progression of attacks through a network and in generating

typical IDS alerts within a network, providing a simulated network structure to work with
is a necessity. Even though these processes could be established on a physical network,
the large overhead costs and long testing times make such an arrangement highly
undesirable. Furthermore, covering the large variety of network setups and sizes with
physical means is nearly impossible. Simulation modeling allows for numerous setups
and significant structural changes to be made quickly. Although other simulation models
have been developed to portray the cyber attack process, the generation of IDS alerts, or
both of these functions, these models lack the functionality and modularity necessary to
generate the proper input needed for development of information fusion tools for the
cyber-attack realm.
Garg, Kwiat, and Upadhyaya (2006) developed a framework (known as SimCo)
for measuring the capabilities of security mechanisms in detecting attacks. Inaccuracies
among intrusion detection systems and other security systems can have a significant
impact on organizations; thus, identifying where flaws lie within such systems is crucial.
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The framework developed included a platform for simulating complex attacks along with
templates for both security detection mechanisms and for attacks. However, even though
IDSs were included, this project was focused more on evaluating differences among the
security systems rather than providing IDS alert data. The IDSs and other security
systems were modeled in much more complexity than is really necessary for a simulation
specifically requiring alert data.

In most cases, the entire functionality of the

IDS/security system was modeled. This functionality focused mostly on the internal
workings of the sensors, which included modeling the means by which attack steps were
identified and correlated to alerts. For the simulation methodology needed in this thesis
for strictly generating IDS alerts, the means by which the alerts are generated is irrelevant
as long as the alerts are representative of the corresponding IDS alert format.
DeLooze et al. (2004) have also developed a simulation methodology to model
the combination of cyber attacks and security systems. They developed a simulation
model called “The Virtual Network Simulation” to assist in education and training
courses for individuals pursuing careers in network security. The simulation model
developed includes a vast amount of network devices (including IDSs) that can be setup
at the user’s discretion, and the model interjects simulated attacks into these networks.
However, since this system is setup as a training tool, the model requires consistent
interaction with an individual to monitor, make adjustments to, and handle problems
occurring within the simulated network. Therefore, this tool is also not well designed for
data generation associated with the attacks and IDS alerts.
Significant work has also been accomplished in developing a simulation model
for both generating attacks and producing associated IDS alerts. Kuhl and Kistner (2005),
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through the use of the commercial simulation package ARENA, developed a simulation
structure that allows for computer networks to be modeled and cyber attacks to occur
within the networks and produce alerts for corresponding IDS sensors included in the
modeled computer network. Kistner (2006) further expanded upon this work to develop
more detailed attributes for the network devices and provide a methodology for
automatically generating attacks based on a set of parameters. Section 4.5 provides a
more detailed discussion of the research performed by Kuhl and Kistner (2005) and
Kistner (2006).
4.3

Information Fusion Techniques Applied to the Cyber Domain
Information fusion techniques, as recently applied to cyber security issues, have

the potential to identify useful trends and a significant amount of information about
hacker attacks based on data provided by IDS sensors. In general, multi-sensor data
fusion refers to the techniques used to combine data from multiple sensors along with
related information from databases and templates to determine certain information about
the system of interest. The use of multiple sensors allows for more accurate information
that accounts for a wider spectrum of the system, in addition to the simple statistical
advantage of having more data points to base a decision on. This information fusion
technique has previously been used in surveillance mechanisms, guidance and control of
vehicles, monitoring machinery, medical diagnosis, and other military and non-military
purposes (Hall and Llinas, 1998).
The generic process of fusing data has five specific levels of functionality defined
by the Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL). Figure 4.2 depicts these levels with respect
to a variety of multi-sensor data fusion applications. Level 0 refers to the pre-processing
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of data, where data most pertinent to the current situation is filtered from a large set of
raw data.

Level 1 represents Object Refinement, where data is transformed for

consistency and several attributes of the objects are identified and classified. Level 2
represents Situation Refinement, where relationships are developed between objects and
events through incorporation of environmental information and previous (a priori)
knowledge.

Level 3 represents Threat Refinement, where the current situation is

projected into the future to determine potential threats and vulnerabilities to the system,
as well as opportunities available. Level 4 represents Process Refinement, where the
long-term data fusion performance is monitored, improvement opportunities are
identified, and adjustments are made to the system to achieve some desired effects (Hall
and Llinas, 1998).

Figure 4.2: JDL Fusion Levels (Hall and Llinas, 1998)
Holender, Stotz, and Sudit (2005) have developed an “Information Fusion Engine
for Real-time Decision Making” (called INFERD) with the capabilities necessary to be
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used with IDS alert data in the cyber-domain. Essentially, the alerts produced by IDS
sensors are treated as data points that INFERD can accept as input in order to piece
together the information to identify attacks or malicious activity occurring in the network.
Therefore, INFERD can provide some awareness with regard to the current state of the
network (in real-time) that alert data is received from. With respect to the JDL fusion
levels, INFERD accounts for a combination of Level 1 and Level 2 fusion. In addition to
the data input into the engine, INFERD also requires attack templates along with some
information regarding the network topology (which refers primarily to the structure of the
network being assessed). Although the intent of this engine is to correlate actual alerts to
determine attacks, the process is still in development and needs extensive testing.
Since actual IDS alert data is challenging to obtain, as discussed previously, and
since there is no faultless method to evaluate whether the engine is perfectly identifying
the situation, the use of simulation to provide representative IDS alert data is very
beneficial in this spectrum of the fusion process. Also, by assisting the development of
INFERD, the use of simulation can also provide benefits for the higher levels within this
fusion process. For example, TANDI, a fusion engine used within Level 3 of the fusion
process, provides predictions of the attacker’s next moves (essentially, the threat imposed
by the hacker) (Holender et al., 2006). With a simulation model, we will know exactly
what the attacker’s next moves are, and this knowledge can be compared with the output
that TANDI provides to give a measure of TANDI’s effectiveness. The simulation could
even go beyond this to allow an engine or methodology focused on process refinement
(Level 4 fusion) to update the simulation model in real-time and evaluate how well the
entire fusion system is functioning within a network.
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4.4

Object-Oriented Simulation Modeling
The use of an object-oriented approach to simulation modeling has many

advantages over a procedural approach. The ability to re-use and extend objects is a
central feature and advantage to developing an object-oriented framework. Also, since
objects are modular, the information associated with each instantiation of an object is
held in only one location, with references to the object’s location when needed (Bischack
and Roberts, 1991). Furthermore, with an object-oriented simulation focusing on
representing objects, the computations and modeling logic can be divided among objects
(classes). This delegation of modeling functions provides a more organized structure than
would otherwise be possible with procedure-based modeling (Joines and Roberts, 1998).
The first step in developing an object-oriented simulation model is to devise the
appropriate software architecture concept. This includes a broad definition of how the
model and the simulation aspects and controls will interact at a high-level. Sarjougian and
Singh (2003) recommend the use of three separate frames within the simulation
architecture to provide the needed interaction. These include a model, control, and view
frame. The model frame in this situation composes the application functionality and
handles the states of objects being represented. The control links user actions to model
changes and selects specific “views” or states of the system to present to the user. The
view represents the user side of the architecture, where the model is rendered and user
gestures are provided. In developing a discrete-event simulation architecture, Brunner
and Schriber (2005) indicate the importance of providing a “transaction-flow world
view,” where a discrete amount of traffic or transactions are moving from point-to-point
(or object to object) within a system in order to change the state of the system. Numerous
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approaches can be taken to provide this type of interaction, but the key is to establish a
framework that will clearly define this transaction-flow.
The structure for the classes in the desired simulation framework is another major
consideration. Darmont (2000) proposes the use of a centralized simulation class that ties
together all aspects of the system. The class includes a link to a scheduler class that
handles the various discrete events that occur during the simulation. An event manager
class is used to provide implementation of the different events within the simulation
model. Also, the resources involved are handled through a resource class linked with the
simulation class. This approach allows for the simulation class specifically to handle the
transactions involved in the simulation; although, there is some redundancy with having
both a scheduler and event manager class. Joines and Roberts (1998) provide a detailed
structure by which to setup a simulation class hierarchy. The top of this structure
includes an abstract class with properties and methods available to all simulation
components. Children (sub-classes) of this class include a random class that provides
random number generation and distributions, a statistics class to calculate model statistics
based on the attributes accessible to the abstract class, and a simulation element to model
and run a simulation.

The simulation element has five primary child classes that

represent the main modeling components. An events class is used to organize and
implement the events defined during the simulation run. A process class is used to
handle specific resource manipulating processes. An entities class is used to represent the
different transactions that move through a system. A nodes class represents specific
points or objects in a system that the entities enter and exit. Lastly, a choices class
handles the logic needed to manipulate transactions in the system. This overall approach
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is broad enough to account for numerous types of systems that could be modeled through
discrete-event simulation. Furthermore, the inheritance structure allows for the common
simulation properties to be easily accessible.
The real functionality of the simulation model itself, though, is still left to the
objects. The simulation structure and class hierarchy are only useful if the individual
objects involved are given the appropriate methods and attributes needed to effectively
interact and change the model state. Baezner and Lomow focus on three basic criteria to
provide the general needs of a simulation: an entities class, an events class, and a
property to keep the simulation time. The entities class is used to model any of the
physical objects or processes being modeled, and the events class is used to schedule and
trigger the actions of all entities. The simulation time is appropriately updated through
the events. Joines and Roberts (1998) further extend their class hierarchy
recommendations by providing specific information about the classes involved. Three
classes of interest in the hierarchy are the events, entities, and nodes classes. The entities
class provides the elements that are to be moved throughout the system to invoke
changes. The entity class includes methods to obtain the entity’s creation time, status,
current location, and unique identifier (ID). The nodes class is used to model different
nodes or locations within the modeled system. This class allows for a network of nodes
to be established and provides methods to obtain the type of node, identify entities at the
current node, list nodes within the system or network, and identify the node ID. There
are also methods triggered when an entity enters a node or leaves a node. The events
class contains methods to set and get the event time, process the event, and manage the
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events and what they are associated with. The next section will provide more details
regarding to the handling of events.
The majority of discrete-event simulation approaches rely on methods for
handling a series of defined events. Typically, events are added to an ordered list in
which each event is handled separately based on the time. In this setup, a simulation
clock keeps track of the time and only advances in discrete amounts when all of the
events for the current time are finished processing (Brunner and Schriber, 2005). In the
structure proposed by Joins and Roberts (1998), events are pulled off of a calendar and
trigger appropriate transactions in the model. These transactions (entities) trigger node
events and, thus, allow for a fairly decentralized method of logically handling each event.
Lin, Sheu, and Yeh (1996) propose an event handling method that focuses on sending
each current event to a specific event handling routine (either a class or method) to
handle the logic associated with that event. Although this can simplify and organize the
responses to events, the logic required to check the routine could be avoided when
utilizing the overloading features of class inheritance.
Numerous applications have been developed to illustrate and utilize the power
that object-oriented simulation has to offer.

One such application, YANSL, was

developed by Joines and Roberts (1998) as an illustration of their proposed objectoriented simulation architecture. YANSL includes both transaction and resource entities
moving through a network of node objects. The node objects consist of a variety of both
departure and destination node types with different functionality, including a source node
(to create entities), queue node (to hold entities), activity node (to modify entities), and
sink node (to remove entities). The event handling triggers methods in the departure and
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destination nodes to be appropriately triggered and adjust the movement and attributes of
entities in the model. YANSL still has significant modeling and statistical limits, but the
extensive use of class inheritance effectively reduces the amount of logical statements
and decisions to be made, and allows for decentralized control of the simulation.
4.5

Cyber Attack Simulator Developed by Kuhl and Kistner
The simulation model developed by Kuhl and Kistner (2005), known as the Cyber

Attack Simulator, was created using ARENA, a commercial simulation modeling
software developed by Rockwell Software. Within this software, a custom template is
provided to represent the network devices that needed to be modeled. This template
includes the connectors (routers or switches) and the machines. Also, the ability to
connect these devices allows a user to graphically setup a simple model of a computer
network. Figure 4.3 displays a sample network setup in this interface.

Figure 4.3: Sample Computer Network

33

The machines within the simulated network are provided with attributes, such as
an IP address, the type of access, and the use of an IDS sensor, to assist in the attack
modeling. The IP address is used as a unique identifier, the type of access (internet
access) controls whether attacks could start at a machine, and use of an IDS sensor
dictates whether the machine would generate appropriate IDS alerts (for the
corresponding sensor type) based on the traffic to/from the sensor. Kistner (2006) also
expanded upon these attributes to add an indication of the type of machine (whether it
was a PC or a server) and the operating system. These attributes are important because
they narrow down the type of attack exploits that can be performed on a machine.
However, there are still more attributes that should be considered in effectively modeling
what exploits can occur, especially with respect to a machine’s software and services.
Additionally, the ability to represent a group (or subnet) of machines can simplify the
process of modeling networks.
The connectors within the simulated network are also provided with the use of an
IDS sensor, which functions in the same way as with the machines. In reality, though,
there exist differences between these two types of sensors (network-based and host-based
sensors) that should be considered in the simulation model. The IDS alerts are generated
by matching the attack (or noise) traffic with a sensor alert through a file containing
direct correlations between the attack signatures and the alert messages.
The Cyber Attack Simulator, through integration with VBA, provides forms for
setting up attacks on the modeled networks. Cyber attacks, initially, have to be specified
by the user. A source (attacking) machine and a target (attacked) machine are specified
for each step, along with what exploit or specific category of exploits is going to be used.
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Also, the model is limited to allow only ten attacks and twenty-five steps per attack. This
process puts stringent limitations on how much IDS alert data can be generated, and
introduces significant user bias to the system.

For these reasons, Kistner (2006)

developed an automatic attack methodology that generates a set of attack steps based on
several attack parameters provided by the user. These parameters primarily include the
target machine, goal type, efficiency of the attack, stealth of the attack, and the average
step time. The efficiency relates to the directness of the attack and how successful the
steps are, while the stealth relates to how hidden the attack is from being detected by
avoiding certain categories of exploits. Although the methodology provided a good basis
for developing unbiased attacks in a short amount of time, there are still significant
limitations to the types of attacks possible. Considerations regarding the parameters
provided and the logic within the methodology can lead to significant improvements in
the attack generation process.
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5 Simulation Model Structure
Prior to this thesis, the cyber attack simulator was initially developed using the
ARENA software. This development resulted in a model with basic network editing
capabilities and a reasonable level of attack specification capabilities. Although this
ARENA model has proved that the concept of simulating cyber attacks is plausible, the
new features desired for the model, such as working with XML data, are beyond the
limitations of ARENA. The desire to overcome such limitations has since motivated the
development of an independent simulation model that can be appropriately configured to
implement features that are not possible with the ARENA simulator. This new model
includes a customized interface specific to the development of network structures and
attack scenarios, a series of input and output options, and more detailed features in
defining the networks and attack scenarios.
The model was developed using the object-oriented programming language Java.
Java has many desirable characteristics in modeling realistic environments. Java is also a
cross-platform programming language that only requires the JRE (Java runtime
environment) to run a java program on any platform. The remainder of this section
discusses the primary intentions of the model, provides a background of the development
environment used, and presents the structure of the modeling elements.
5.1

Modeling Intentions and Model Overview
The overall goal of developing this cyber attack simulation model is to create an

application that can generate valid intrusion detection system alerts in a virtual network
representative of a real private network. With the cyber attack simulator, a user can
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create or load a specific network topology, specify the vulnerabilities of the network,
create and run attack scenarios, and view sensor alert data produced. Several inputs and
outputs are necessary to the functionality of the simulator. A diagram depicting the types
of inputs and outputs is displayed in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Cyber Attack Simulator Functionality
As is shown in Figure 5.1, the simulator consists of three primary categories of
inputs and outputs: configuration inputs, XML imports and exports, and scenario results.
A sensor management add-on, developed by McConky (2007) is also shown.
The configuration inputs include data that is loaded from files as the simulator is
opened. The guidance template file is a directed graph that indicates what sequence of
stages can be used in an attack and what categories of exploits are included in each stage.
This information is used when attacks are generated based on a set of parameters.
Another file includes the service to vulnerability mappings, which maps a machine
service to a set of vulnerabilities through the use of service IDs and vulnerability IDs.
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This effectively indicates what exploits can be executed on a machine that is running a
certain service. The default exploits file loads a database of known exploits (also referred
to as available actions) that the simulator can choose and filter from. This database of
actions is used by the simulator when creating the individual steps of an attack as well as
when creating the noise (or false-positives) that occurs during an attack scenario.
The XML imports and exports allow for structured XML documents to be created
by or interpreted by the simulator. These documents can also be created by and
interpreted by other applications, providing a means by which the simulator can interface
with these applications. A document that is commonly used by the information fusion
tools in development is the “Virtual Terrain” XML document. This document depicts the
detailed structure of a network, whether the network is real or virtual. Figure 5.2 shows
how the virtual terrain document is used among different applications. The cyber attack
simulator specifically can read in a network model from the virtual terrain or create a
virtual terrain document from a network that has been modeled. Therefore, applications
that make use of the alert data generated by the simulator can also be provided with the
entire structure of the network used to generate the data. Also, an additional XML
document depicting the set of attacks in an attack scenario can be created by or read in by
the simulator.
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Figure 5.2: Integration of Virtual Terrain
The scenario results include data that is generated during an attack scenario run and
output into text files. A ground truth file lists all of the attack-based actions that occur,
along with details such as the attack that the action belonged to, the source and
destination of the attack, and the success or failure of the action. A set of sensor alert files
list all of the IDS alerts generated by sensors placed in the network model, with a
separate file for each sensor. These IDS alerts correspond to both attack-based actions
and noise-based actions.
Lastly, the sensor management add-on includes the appropriate functionality to
define rules for the manner in which sensors handle the alerts generated. A fusion engine
queue is modeled, and alerts are sent to this queue as defined by the sensor rules.
Performance metrics are generated for purposes of comparing the sensor rules. For more
information regarding the sensor management add-on and the underlying methodology,
refer to McConky (2007).
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5.2

Java Background
Before delving into the details of the program’s structure, the reader needs to have a

basic understanding of Java’s object-oriented approach. This section describes some of
the basic features and benefits of the Java programming language. Those familiar with
the basic structure of Java (or a similar object-oriented language) can proceed to the next
section.
The Java language is implemented as an object-oriented programming language.
The primary approach in object-oriented programming is to represent real-world objects,
such as people or machines, as programming classes with unique attributes and functions
(or methods) that the objects can provide. Simulations in general attempt to provide an
accurate model of some real-world situation that can be manipulated and studied to
evaluate existing or proposed systems.

Therefore, the use of object-oriented

programming in developing a simulation framework has many benefits when considering
that simulation models tend to represent the interactions between real objects (Bischack
and Roberts, 1991). For example, in the case of the cyber attack simulator, a Sensor class
is used to represent a real-world IDS sensor. Each sensor included in a modeled network
represents one instance of this class. A sensor instance is then given unique attributes,
which include the location, type, alerts produced, etc. The class also includes methods
that each instance can use, such as adding a new alert to the sensor’s list of alerts or
outputting all of the alerts produced to a text file.
In addition to the use of classes in representing objects, Java has other key features
that help in providing the modularity and reusability to make a simple and flexible
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programming language.

These features include inheritance, encapsulation, and

polymorphism.
Inheritance allows a class or object to be treated as a child of another class. All of
the attributes and methods associated with the parent class are inherited in child classes.
Additionally, child classes can declare new classes and attributes that make them unique
from the parent. Also, a child class can overload the methods used in parent classes in
order to provide a different functionality (Bailey et al., 2005). Referring back to the
sensor class example, two other classes are used to specifically represent network-based
sensors and host-based sensors. Since these classes are slightly more specific versions of
the sensor class, they use the inheritance property to acquire all of the same attributes and
methods as a generic sensor.
Encapsulation allows for the attributes and methods specific to a class to be
shielded from other classes if desired. By making the attributes and methods private in
this manner, external classes must access the attributes and methods through a type of
interface to the class. This interface is in the form of public methods where the
programmer can clearly define and limit how a class’s attributes can viewed and changed
and how methods can be used. The use of packages in Java is another form of
encapsulation. Packages allow several related classes to be grouped together with fewer
restrictions on class interactions.
Polymorphism allows multiple classes to utilize the same behavior by
implementing shared methods. This also includes the ability to use different constructors
in initializing objects (Joines and Roberts, 1998). For example, in the cyber attack
simulator, the Machine class uses a different constructor for defining a single host
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machine than the class uses for defining a machine that belongs to a host cluster (or
subnet).
In review, the ability to re-use and extend objects through the features described
earlier is a central characteristic and advantage to developing a modeling framework in
Java. Also, since objects are modular, the information associated with each instantiation
of an object is held in only one location, with references to the object’s location when
needed (Bischack and Roberts, 1991). Furthermore, the simulation modeling logic can
be appropriately divided among classes. This delegation of modeling functions provides
a more organized structure than would otherwise be possible with procedure-based
modeling (Joines and Roberts, 1998).
5.3

Package Structure
The simulator has its classes organized into six packages based on the interactions

of the classes. These include a simulation package, network package, attack package,
visual package, VT (virtual terrain) interface package, and a sensor management package.
The diagram in Figure 5.3 illustrates this structure and lists some of the primary class
types and/or features of each package.

Figure 5.3: Cyber Attack Simulator Package Structure
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The simulation package includes classes to maintain and simulate through an
ordered list of events. The package also includes classes to provide random number
generation. Section 5.4 discusses the simulation package in further detail.
The network package includes all of the classes used in defining the network
topology and device attributes. Also, the connectivity of network devices is implemented
through methods within the classes. Section 5.5 discusses the network package in further
detail.
The attack package includes the classes necessary to create attack scenarios, which
consist of a series of attacks on a network along with network noise. The package
includes classes and methods used to automatically generate a series of attacks when only
attack parameters are specified. Also, the attack package contains classes that act as a
database for available attack actions (or exploits) and sensor alerts. Section 5.6 discusses
the attack package in further detail.
The visual package includes classes used to provide an interface to the user of the
simulator. These classes help makeup the program graphical user interface (GUI), the
network visualization, the data entry forms, and the result displays. Section 5.7 discusses
the visual package in further detail.
The VT interface package contains four classes used to parse and create XML
documents with virtual terrain data and attack data. Two of the classes are static classes
that serve only the purpose of providing a series of class variables to represent XML
elements and attributes. The remaining two classes are used to read and write XML
documents, with one class devoted to the virtual terrain data and the other class devoted
to the attack data. These two classes utilize the JDOM package, which is a separate
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publicly available package used to write and interpret XML documents when provided
with the structure of the document. The JDOM package is not included with the basic
Java Development Kit (JDK).
The sensor management package includes classes to define and implement a set of
sensor rules. The package also includes a fusion engine class and specific sensor classes
that inherit from the sensor classes defined in the network package. More information
regarding the structure of the sensor management package can be acquired by referring to
McConky’s thesis (2007).
5.4

Simulation Package
One of the crucial components of the model is the underlying simulation

functionality. This functionality is provided by using objects and methods that are
commonly found in an object-oriented simulation framework. In the model, the
simulation package encompasses a set of custom-made classes that emulate the typical
workings of a simulation framework. Figure 5.4 illustrates the simulation package class
structure as a simplified UML diagram.

Figure 5.4: Simulation Package Class Structure
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The structure used in Figure 5.4 depicts labeled blocks as classes, while lines
between two blocks represent a relationship between classes. The directed arrow
indicates inheritance; for instance, the Rand Lib class inherits from the Rng Stream class.
The diamond-ended connection indicates composition; for example, an instance of the
Event Order class is treated as an attribute of the Run Simulation class. Table 5.1
provides details regarding each class in the package.
Table 5.1: Simulation Package Class Details
Class Name
Node

Type
Abstract

Entity

Abstract

Event Order

Concrete

Run
Simulation

Concrete

Rng Stream

Concrete

Rand Lib

Concrete

Description
Represents a physical location that entities enter and exit. This
class is not directly instantiated, but instead acts as a superclass for the classes in the Network Package representing
network devices.
Represents objects that move between nodes. The class also
includes attributes that can be changed or used by the nodes.
This class is also not directly instantiated, but instead acts as a
super-class for specific classes in the Attack Package
representing network traffic.
The event order class is essentially a list that keeps track of
the events to occur in the simulation, in chronological order.
An instance of this class is treated as an attribute of the run
simulation class.
Executes a discrete event simulation of the attack scenario by
pulling events from (and adding events to) the event order
class. The run simulation class also keeps track of the
simulation time, which is based on the time of the current
event.
The RNG (random number generator) stream class provides
the functionality to generate random numbers when provided
with a starting seed. The RNG stream is a publicly available
class created by L’Ecuyer et al. (2002)
The rand lib class inherits from the rng stream and provides
additional functionality to allow for multiple streams to be
defined. The class also provides the functionality to sample
numbers from a specific distribution (such as Uniform and
Exponential).

The six classes included in the simulation package provide the basis for running a
discrete event simulation in the cyber attack simulator; however, the implementation of
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these simulation elements is substantially integrated with both the network and attack
package. Therefore, a clear understanding of both of these packages is necessary before
providing more details about the simulation. Section 7 of this thesis (attack simulation
methodology) provides a more in-depth description of the functionality of the simulation
elements and how they are integrated with the other packages.
5.5

Network Package
The model includes a set of classes used to define a virtual computer network.

The network package encompasses this set of classes, which range from physical network
devices to software settings on these devices. Figure 5.5 illustrates the network package
class structure, while Table 5.2 provides details about each class included in the package.

Figure 5.5: Network Package Class Structure
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Table 5.2: Network Package Class Details
Class Name
Network

Network
Hardware

Connector

Machine

Sensor

Network
Sensor
Host Sensor

Port

Service

Type
Description
Concrete Represents a virtual network, and the class consists of a set of
connector and machine objects. The class also contains
attributes such as the network name, the starting IP address,
and the attack scenario objects created for the network (from
the attack package).
Abstract Represents the physical devices that are linked together to
form the network. This class itself is not instantiated, but both
the connector and machine class are sub-classes of the
network hardware class. Key attributes include the name,
unique id, and IDS used (if any).
Concrete Generically represents a network linking device, such as a
hub, router, or switch. Some key attributes of the connector
class include the machines and other connectors linked to the
connector and the firewall restrictions (allowed/banned ports).
Also, the class inherits attributes from the network hardware
class.
Concrete Generically represents a host computer or server located in a
network. This class has attributes such as the type of machine,
the group ID, the operating system, the services running, the
connector that the machine is linked with, and the IP address.
The machine class inherits attributes from the network
hardware class.
Concrete Represents an IDS sensor, which can be added to devices in a
network. The sensor class includes attributes such as the type
of sensor, the location of the sensor, and a list of alerts
generated by the sensor.
Concrete The network sensor class is a sub-class of the sensor class
representing an NIDS (network IDS). This type of sensor is
placed on connectors only, and monitors network traffic.
Concrete The host sensor class is a sub-class of the sensor class
representing and HIDS (host IDS). This type of sensor is
placed on machines only, and monitors logs (which
essentially represent successful network traffic).
Concrete Represents a specific port that is either allowed or banned for
traffic moving along a particular path through the network.
The class includes attributes such as the port number, the
protocol, and whether it is allowed or not.
Concrete Represents a service (or type of software) that a machine is
running. This class has attributes such as the service name,
unique ID, and ports used for the service.
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As mentioned previously, the abstract Node class in the simulation package is
used as a super-class of the physical network components. This is accomplished by the
network hardware class inheriting from the node class. Therefore, both connectors and
machine objects represent nodes that entities can move between. This is representative of
a real network, as packets of information do move through defined paths between
network devices. Also, although there is no specific subnet (or host cluster) object, a
subnet is defined by providing a series of machine objects with the same group ID.
Therefore, each member of the subnet still functions independently, yet can be controlled
collectively. Chapter 6 of this thesis discusses the methodology used in providing the
network functionality and creating virtual networks that are representative of real private
networks.
5.6

Attack Package
With the stationary aspects of the cyber attack model defined in the network

package, the attack package is intended to incorporate the “mobile” components of the
model (or at least mobile with respect to the movement of information). The attack
package essentially includes classes for modeling the attacks that can progress through a
computer network, along with other non-attack related traffic as well. Figure 5.6
illustrates the class structure of the attack package.
The dashed arrows in Figure 5.6 represent a dependence relationship. In this
relationship, the class is dependent on another class for either its methods or attributes;
however, neither inheritance nor composition is used. For instance, the Attack class
accesses the class attributes in the abstract Guidance Template class even though the two
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classes are not physically linked in any manner. Table 5.3 provides details about each
class included in the attack package.

Attack
Scenario

Noise

1

Traffic

0..*

0..* 1

Attack Step

Guidance
Template

Attack

Available
Actions

Vulnerabilities
Available
Alerts

Alert
Attack Package

Figure 5.6: Attack Package Class Structure
In addition, the traffic class inherits from the abstract Entity class defined in the
simulation package. Defining the traffic as a sub-class of the entity class allows for traffic
to be routed between nodes in the network structure just as real network traffic would be
routed through devices in a real network. Additional methodology is provided to prohibit
or allow the routing of traffic between two nodes and to generate an alert if a sensor is
present at a node. Chapter 7 of this thesis discusses the methodology used to manage the
flow of network traffic as well as the methodology associated with generating attacks and
attack scenarios.
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Table 5.3: Attack Package Class Details
Class Name
Traffic

Type
Abstract

Attack Step

Concrete

Noise

Concrete

Attack
Scenario

Concrete

Attack

Concrete

Guidance
Template

Abstract

Vulnerabilities Abstract

Available
Actions

Abstract

Available
Alerts

Concrete

Alert

Concrete

Description
Generically represents the information moving between
network devices. Some attributes of the traffic class include
the time, source machine, destination machine, action
performed.
Represents traffic that is associated with a cyber attack. The
class includes attributes indicating the attack that the step
belongs to and the sequence of the step.
Represents traffic that is not associated with an attack
(although the traffic can still be considered malicious by
sensors).
Represents a series of attacks and a set of noise parameters,
which effectively define a cyber attack scenario that can be
run as a simulation. Attributes for this class include a set of
attack objects, noise-related parameters, the network the
scenario corresponds with, and a start time for the scenario.
Represents an individual attack, which includes a series of
steps progressing through the network toward a specific goal.
The attack class also includes parameters that can be used to
set up an automatically generated attack (rather than
specifying the steps). The attack class attributes include a set
of attack steps, the start time of the attack, the total attack
time (or, alternatively, the average step time), the final target
machine, the final goal of the attack, and the auto-attack
parameters.
Used to establish the structure of the guidance template
input. This class is utilized by the auto-attack generation to
determine the appropriate stages that the attack will progress
through.
Used to provide the mapping of service IDs to a set of
exploits that the service is vulnerable to through the use of
vulnerability IDs.
Represents a database of actions (or potential exploits) that
are available to be used when generating the network traffic.
Each action has a unique index that its attributes are
referenced by. These attributes include the stage category,
the vulnerability ID, the type of machine required, the
operating system required, and the default port used.
This class inherits from the available actions class to provide
additional sensor-related alert information about specific
actions. One instance is created for each unique sensor type.
Represents an alert generated by a sensor. Attributes of this
class include the time of the alert, the action detected, and the
path of the traffic that produced the alert.
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5.7

Visual Package
An important aspect pertaining to the use of the program is the graphical user

interface (GUI). The GUI for the cyber attack simulator is provided through the many
classes contained in the visual package. Figure 5.7 illustrates some of the primary classes
(and interfaces) that make up this package.

Figure 5.7: Visual Package Class Structure
The small circles attached to the classes in Figure 5.7 represent custom-made
interfaces that are implemented by those classes. An interface in Java reacts to certain
actions (user actions in this case) to invoke methods in another class. For instance, the
Mouse Monitor detects the clicking and movement of the mouse by the user. The visual
package also contains over twenty other forms not displayed in the figure. These forms
are either sub-classes of the Basic Network Form or subclasses of some other form, but
the forms all inherit the properties and methods of the basic network form. These
additional forms are used for both the entry and viewing of data for the simulator.
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Table 5.4 provides details about the primary classes that make up the visual
package. An overview of all of the forms used in the visual package is provided in
Appendix A.
Table 5.4: Visual Package Class Details
Class Name
Cyber Attack
Program
Basic
Network
Form
Network
Frame

Drawing
Canvas
Generic
Block
Connector
Block
Machine
Block
Subnet Block
Percentage
Verifier
Window
Monitor
Internal
Frame
Monitor
Key Monitor
Mouse
Monitor

Type
Description
Concrete The main class and primary interface for working with the
program. This class provides the user with menus, toolbars,
and a work area for managing multiple networks.
Abstract Represents the basic structure of the program’s data entry
forms. The class provides details about the structure and
placement of a form and keeps track of the active window.
Concrete Provides the interaction with an individual network. This
frame is placed in the program’s working area and includes a
drawing canvas object along with components used to setup
attack scenarios.
Concrete Provides a canvas that is used for constructing the network
topology. Different network components are added as
“blocks” to this drawing area.
Abstract Represents the basic structure for a block component that will
be placed in the drawing canvas to visually represent a device
(or set of devices) in the network.
Concrete A sub-class of the generic block class that represents a
connector in the network.
Concrete A sub-class of the generic block class that represents an
individual machine in the network, with a different image for
hosts and servers.
Concrete A sub-class of the generic block class that represents a group
or subnet of multiple machines in the network.
Interface Provides some forms with the ability to monitor the values
entered by the user and update other values accordingly.
Interface Used with each form to monitor when the form is closed and
switch the user’s “focus” to the appropriate window (or form).
Interface Monitors when a network frame is added or removed from the
program workspace to appropriately update the menu options
of the cyber attack program class.
Interface Monitor for keys pressed by the user while drawing the
network, such as the “esc” or “delete” key.
Interface Monitors for mouse actions performed by the user, which
allow the movement and editing of blocks in the canvas.
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Upon running the model, the user is initially provided with an instance of the
cyber attack program class, along with all default inputs loaded. This interface allows the
user to load networks, create networks, or alter the program preferences. More menus and
options become available once a network model is actively displayed. Figure 5.8 displays
a screenshot of the program with two example networks displayed. The figure also
indicates some of the key features of the program (red boxes/arrows).

Program Menu
Toolbar Buttons

Network Frames

Blocks
(Network Components)

Drawing Canvas

Figure 5.8: Screenshot of Cyber Attack Program
In Figure 5.8, for the network shown in the foreground, the objects drawn
represent the visual network components. Router 1 and Router 2 are instances of the
connector block class, which visually represent instances of the connector class (in the
network package). Server and Admin are instances of the machine block class, which
represent machine objects. Subnet is an instance of the subnet block class and represents
a set of machine objects. The network canvas class also provides methodology to draw

53

connections between objects in the network that are physically linked. The figure
displays that Router 2, Server and Admin are all connected with Router 1, and that
Subnet is connected with Router 2. The blocks in the canvas can be moved around, and
double-clicking on a particular block will invoke a form to edit the object that the block
represents. Additional blocks, connections, and even attack scenarios can be setup using
the appropriate buttons provided in the network frame, program toolbar, and program
menus. Also, the program provides an interface of forms used to both run a simulation
and display results once both a network and an attack scenario for the network have been
created.
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6 Network Methodology
The ability to define a well structured and detailed virtual network is an important
aspect of providing realistic Intrusion Detection System alerts. In this application, the
modeled network must be representative of a real private network, and network-related
attributes that the model provides must reflect real network attributes that can potentially
have an effect on the IDS sensors and alerts. This chapter details the methodology used to
supply the simulator with network modeling capabilities that fulfill both of these
requirements. By modeling the network to meet these requirements, a network structure
is provided that can both effectively and efficiently be used in constructing cyber attacks
and generating IDS sensor alerts.
The chapter starts by discussing the architecture of a typical private network and
how the model takes this architecture into consideration when modeling a network
topology. Next, the approach taken to model machines (or computers) in the network is
discussed. Then, the connectivity and permissions associated with the connectors in a
network is explained. Additionally, the placement and functionality of both NIDS and
HIDS sensors is discussed. Lastly, the process and critical details of reading and writing a
“virtual terrain” document are reviewed.
6.1

Network Architecture
The structure of a private computer network can take on a variety of forms. In the

simplest case, all of the network devices (host computers, servers, printers, and modems)
can be connected to a single central hub (connector) that allows all devices to
communicate directly with each other. This setup, though, provides limited security once
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any device in the network becomes compromised. The modern approach to setting up a
network is to create several different levels or tiers within the network. Each of these
levels consists of a specific set of network devices, and the levels deeper into the network
are more difficult to get access to from an external source. Figure 6.1 illustrates this
concept with an example three-level network structure.

Figure 6.1: Network Levels Concept
For the network structure in Figure 6.1, Level 1 typically represents a set of web
servers and ftp servers that are setup in the network. These servers are connected directly
to Router 1, which provides a firewall that allows only a specific subset of traffic to the
servers. Level 2 commonly represents a set of internal servers and administrator host
machines. Internal servers cannot be directly accessed from an external source, while the
administrator hosts are used to configure both the internal and external servers. Level 3
typically represents a subnet of host machines used by many individuals. Such host
machines are often necessary in providing essential functions for an organization, and the
machines most likely have access to retrieve and alter information on the internal and
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external servers. These machines are therefore connected at the deepest level within the
network.
The cyber attack simulator is designed to model a variety of network
configurations; however, the focus is on more intelligently configured networks that
provide at least some breakdown of the network into multiple levels. Although simplistic,
centralized-hub networks can still be modeled, the simulator contains several useful
features to assist in defining multi-level networks. One of the primary features is the use
of a “parent-child” relationship in modeling the links between connector objects. This
type of setup is a tree structure where each connector linked with another connector can
either be treated as a “parent” or “child” of that connector. A parent connector refers to a
connector at a higher or shallower level of the network (closer to the external portion);
while a child connector refers to a connector deeper in the network structure. To keep the
network structures reasonably simple and avoid cases where the network levels are not
clearly defined, a connector is limited to having one parent connection. Although some
real networks may allow multiple connections to a higher portion of the network, this is a
redundant approach that forms in a complete loop within the network. Having a complete
loop results in multiple paths possible between devices and complicates the routing of
traffic through the network.
A visual example of the connector linking approach used in the simulator is
displayed in Figure 6.2. The connector blocks feature a special connection point to
indicate which link from the connector represents that connector’s parent. All other links
are treated as child connections. When referring to Router 2 in the figure, Router 1
represents the parent connector, while Router 3 and Router 4 are the child connectors.
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Figure 6.2: Parent-Child Relationship
The simulator prohibits the network structure from containing lateral connections.
For instance, in Figure 6.2, Router 3 and Router 4 cannot be linked in any additional
manner (other than through Router 2) since such a link would result in a complete loop.
Although this limitation can restrict the connectivity of the network, the simulator
provides a way around this limitation, which is discussed in section 6.3.1.
6.2

Machines
The network modeling features of the cyber attack simulator use machine objects

to represent host computers and servers within the network. These two types of devices
are responsible for both information and functionality within a network, and they are the
targets that attackers seek to exploit. Each machine can have a substantial number of
attributes that reflect both the functionality and accessibility of the machine. Modeling all
of these attributes would be far too meticulous for this application. Therefore, the model
focuses on key machine attributes that are associated with or have an important impact on
the attacks and intrusion detection alerts generated.
Machines can either be added to the modeled network individually or in a group,
which is also referred to as a subnet or cluster. When adding an individual machine to the
modeled network, the user is presented with a form that allows for the attributes of that
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machine to be specified. Figure 6.3 displays this form with the attributes assigned. As is
shown in the figure, the attributes of interest in modeling a machine object are the name,
ID, connector linked to, IP address, access, machine type, IDS used (if any), operating
system, services running, IPS used (not currently implemented), and the relative
importance of the machine in the network. Machine subnets (or clusters) are also
provided with this same set of attributes. Refer to section 6.2.1 for information on how
machine subnets/clusters are modeled and created.

Figure 6.3: Form for Creating a Machine
The machine name is primarily used for display purposes and is shown
underneath the machine block that is placed in the network’s canvas. The machine ID
represents a unique (and auto-generated) device ID that is used to reference a specific
machine in the virtual terrain document. The connector refers to which connector the
machine is directly linked with. A machine can only be linked with one connector, and
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this will be shown with a line drawn between the machine and connector in the network’s
canvas.
The IP address is another unique identifier of the machine. In a network,
machines communicate by using the IP address. The source and destination of a
particular packet of network traffic refers to the IP addresses of the machine. Also, the
sensor alert output will refer to a machine by the IP address. By default, the first two
components for all IP addresses of machines in the network are specified in the network
setup. The third component of the IP address is based on the unique ID of the connector
that the machine is linked with. The fourth component, by default, is the next available
unique number (up to a value of 255) when considering IP addresses matching the other
three components.
The external access option indicates whether a machine has direct external access
(meaning that it can be accessed from the internet). Web servers and FTP servers are
examples of machines that will typically have external access. This is an important
attribute, since attackers typically use computers with external access as a stepping stone
into the rest of the network.
The machine type refers to how the machine functions. The options for this
attribute are host, server, and generic. By this point, hosts and servers have already been
described. Generic, though, indicates that the machine has both the features of a host and
a server (or there is no certainty as to which type the machine is). Similarly, the operating
system attribute indicates the underlying software running on the machine. The options
for this attribute currently include Windows XP, Windows 2000, Linux, and UNIX. Both
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the machine type and operating system are important attributes in determining the type of
vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit on a machine.
The IDS option allows for a sensor to be added to the machine. This sensor
represents an HIDS (host-based intrusion detection sensor), which is a sensor that exists
as software running on the machine monitoring the system logs. More information about
the sensors be provided in section 6.4.
The services attribute of a machine indicates which types of software-based
services are running on that particular machine. Referring back to Figure 6.3, the services
button provided opens a separate window that allows for the set of services used to be
specified. Section 6.2.2 provides more depth regarding the services and the role that the
services play in modeling a network.
6.2.1

Subnets/Clusters
A subnet (or host cluster) is not modeled as an individual object, but rather as a

set of machine objects. The machine objects represented in a subnet have only a slight
variation from the structure of individual machine objects. For this reason, the same class
is used for both types (with a different constructor). The primary differences include an
additional attribute for a group ID as well as an attribute for defining an IP range.
The group ID defines which group (essentially, subnet) a machine object belongs
in. Each machine that is part of a specific subnet will be given the same group ID. With
this attribute, the machine objects in a subnet can still be tracked back to the subnet even
when the objects have different names, IDs and IPs. The group ID is kept unique in the
same manner that the device ID is kept unique.
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In addition to the group ID feature, machine objects within a subnet can also
specify the fourth component of the IP address as a range of IPs (such as “0-255”). This
feature allows for a machine object to represent up to 256 machines in a subnet.
Therefore, a subnet can consist of one object that represents all of the IP addresses that
are part of the subnet. In modeling large networks, minimizing the number of objects
used to define a network has several performance benefits, and the option of listing a
range of IPs to define a subnet can help in that respect.
The use of subnets also simplifies the display of and interaction with the modeled
network. In the network’s canvas, a single subnet block represents all of the machines
within a particular subnet. Editing the attributes of this block, such as the machine type,
operating system, and services, will affect the attributes of all machine objects that are
represented by the block.
6.2.2

Services
Services refer to specific software-based applications used by a machine. Services

are another important aspect in determining a machine’s vulnerabilities (which will be
discussed in section 6.2.3). Each type of service has a different set of ports and protocols
that can be used for communication with the service. The set of services considered in the
model are listed in Table 6.1 along with the ports and protocols that are used by the
service. This information is provided by Crothers (2003). These services are chosen
because each service is commonly used and generally requires communication with other
machines either in the network or on the internet.
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Table 6.1: Service Details
Service Name
FTP

Description
File transfer protocol

HTTP (Web)
TFTP
Samba
Apache
SSH
IMAP
Oracle
SQL

Web server

ICMP

Internet Control Message Protocol

Apache web server
Secure Shell

MySQL databases

Protocol
Ports
TCP
20, 21,
989, 990
TCP
80, 443
TCP
69
TCP
901
TCP
80, 8000
TCP
22
TCP
143, 993
TCP
1521
TCP
118, 156,
1433, 1434

The services attribute used by machine objects allows for a list of services to be
defined. By default, the ten services displayed in Table 6.1 are the services that can
initially be selected from. Additional services can be part of this attribute list through the
virtual terrain XML input. This capability is possible because the virtual terrain provides
a direct vulnerability mapping of the services as well as a list of which protocols and
ports the service uses.
In the model, each service is represented as a service object. The service class
defines some basic attributes and methods for the services, and the class also includes
class variables that store the default set of services and ports. These defaults are read in
from a text file upon starting the application.
6.2.3

Vulnerabilities
As mentioned previously, one of the key vulnerabilities in a network relates to the

coding errors and design issues present in certain software applications and services.
Therefore, the vulnerabilities of a machine in the model correspond with the set of
machine attributes that indicate what type of software/service exploits can be performed.
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These attributes include the services running, operating system, and the type of machine.
The concept used for filtering the potential list of exploits based on a machine’s
vulnerabilities is illustrated in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4: Machine Attributes Used to Filter Potential Exploits
Both the operating system and machine type directly filter out many of the
potential exploits that are included in the model’s database. This filtering occurs because
exploits that may be possible using a Windows-based operating system may not work
(using the same method) with a UNIX system.
The services running on a machine use a different approach to filtering potential
exploits. For each operating system and machine type, a service running on a machine
typically has several exploits that can be successfully performed against the machine.
Therefore, one of the inputs to the model is a file mapping the services to a set of
vulnerabilities. Each exploit in the database has a specific vulnerability ID that indicates
what vulnerability is being exploited. Therefore, the set of services included on a
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machine will indicate what exploits can be performed by referring to both the service to
vulnerability mapping and the vulnerability ID of the exploits.
6.3

Connectivity
A connector object in the model generically represents any type of network

linking device, such as a router, switch, hub, etc. However, Java allows for sub-classes of
the connector class to be easily developed to specifically represent one type of connector.
Therefore, a router or switch class (for example) could eventually be created that inherits
the attributes and methods from the connector class. This thesis, though, will focus on
generic connector functionality. By using this approach, only the connector attributes
associated with modeling the device connectivity, network traffic flow, and alert
generation need to be included.
Connectors are added to the model individually, and the user is presented with a
form to specify the connector’s attributes. Figure 6.5 displays the form that is presented.
The attributes of interest for a connector object include the name, unique ID, relative
importance of the connector in the network, parent connector, child connectors, IDS
sensors used (if any), firewall rules, child connector links, and the bandwidth allowed for
security (IDS) purposes.

65

Figure 6.5: Create Connector Form
The connector name, like the machine name, is primarily used for display
purposes and is shown underneath the connector block that is placed in the network’s
canvas. The connector ID represents a unique auto-generated device ID that is used to
both reference the connector in a virtual terrain document and generate the default third
IP component of machines connected to the connector.
The parent connector represents what the connector is connected to at a higher
(shallower) level in the network, while the selected child connectors represent what the
connector is connected to at a lower (deeper) level in the network. A connector can only
have one parent connection in order to maintain the tree structure. There is no limit on the
number of child connectors selected; however, the candidates for child connectors (that
can be selected from) must not yet have a parent connection themselves. The parent and
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child connections are all represented with lines drawn between the connector blocks in
the network’s canvas. A specific parent connection point is used to differentiate a parent
connection from a child connection.
The IDS option allows for a sensor to be added to the connector. This sensor
represents an NIDS (network-based intrusion detection sensor), which is a separate
hardware device that monitors the network traffic. More information about the sensors is
provided in section 6.4.
A connector’s firewall rules can only be established once the parent connector
and/or child connectors are specified. These rules essentially allow or block specific
communication ports in the network traffic depending on the immediate source and
destination of the traffic. Section 6.3.2 discusses how these rules work and how they are
implemented.
The child connector links attribute indicates which of the lower level connectors
can communicate with each other through the current connector. This feature is necessary
since lateral (and possibly looping) connections are not allowed in the model. Section
6.3.1 discusses how the model allows for and makes use of these types of links.
6.3.1

Links
Consider a setup like the one displayed in Figure 6.6. The computers connected to

Router 2 and Router 3 can both communicate with the fileserver on Router 1. Another
server is also connected to Router 3, but the model’s basic connectivity limitations
prohibit any of the machines on Router 2 from communicating with this other server.
This type of communication is commonly found in computer networks where
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administrators wish to keep a crucial server at a deeper and more secure location in the
network structure while still allowing different subnets to access the server.

Figure 6.6: Child Connector Setup Example
As a way to provide this type of lateral communication between machines along
the same network level (but on different connectors), the child links connector attribute is
used.

This attribute is essentially a listing showing which of a connector’s child

connectors can communicate with each other (through the connector). The attribute stores
a set of source and destination communication links, since a network administrator could
only want one-way communication to be allowed. The form for inputting these links is
displayed in Figure 6.7. Through this form, the user can select both the source and
destination connector from the list of available connectors (specifically, the list of child
connectors).
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Figure 6.7: Child Links Form
6.3.2

Firewalls/Port Permissions
The firewall permissions attribute allows a user to indicate what type of network

traffic can be processed, by the connector, through a specific path (or link in the
network). This is the approach used in many network configurations to filter out both
unwanted and unnecessary traffic in certain parts of the network. For example, a server
that works strictly as a Web server will typically not be able to process application
protocols other than HTTP. Also, keeping all of the server’s ports open may leave the
server susceptible to a wide array of exploits that could have easily been avoided by
filtering out network packets by the port used. Figure 6.8 displays a simple network and
example firewall setup that could be used to reduce both the network traffic and
vulnerabilities. In this type of setup, both the immediate source and destination of a
packet are factors in determining whether a connector finds the packet permissible. In the
figure, the blue dashed lines and text boxes indicate what type of traffic is allowed
through Router 1 and Router 2 between a specific source and destination.
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Figure 6.8: Sample Network with Firewall Permissions
The model implements such firewall permissions through a permission list array,
which is an attribute of connector objects. This list specifies, for a source and destination
device, what type of ports and protocols are allowed through the connector. The available
set of source and destination devices include all nodes linked with the connector, such as
machines, child connectors, and the parent connector. For a specific set of source and
destination nodes, there are four different firewall setups that can be used, which include:
allowing all traffic, allowing traffic using a port/protocol combination that is contained
on a list of allowed port/protocol combinations, blocking all traffic, and blocking traffic
using a port/protocol combination that is contained on a list of banned port/protocol
combinations. The lists of allowed or banned port and protocol combinations are modeled
as an array of port objects. The port class defines attributes for the port number, protocol,
and a Boolean indication of whether the port is allowed or banned. To simplify the
process of checking a firewall, the port objects in a permission list must be all allowed or
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all banned for a specific source/destination pairing. The form used to setup a permission
list for a connector is displayed in Figure 6.9. With this form, a user can add a list of
either allowed ports or banned ports for specific source and destination pair.

Figure 6.9: Permission List Form
A port/protocol permission list can be established for any two different devices
(essentially, nodes) linked with the connector, including child links. A sample modeled
network using different firewall permission list configurations is displayed in Figure
6.10. Router 2 and Router 3 in this figure allow all traffic for each source/destination
combination. Router 1, though, has several different permission lists for the possible
source/destination combinations. The set of permission lists used by this connector is
illustrated in Table 6.1. The ports used in the permission lists reflect the services running
on the servers and subnets in the network.
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Figure 6.10: Sample Modeled Network with Firewall Permissions
Table 6.2: Permission Lists for Router 1.
Source Device
(Node)
(Internet)
(Internet)
(Internet)
(Internet)
Web Server
Web Server

Destination Device
(Node)
Web Server
FTP Server
Router 2
Router 3
FTP Server
Router 2

Allowed /
Banned
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed

Web Server

Router 3

Allowed

FTP Server
FTP Server

Web Server
Router 2

Allowed
Allowed

FTP Server

Router 3

Allowed

Router 2
Router 3

Router 3
Router 2

Allowed
Allowed

6.4

Port List
TCP: 80, 143, 443
TCP: 20, 21, 143
TCP: 25, 110, 143, 80, 443
TCP: 25, 110, 143, 80, 443
(All Ports)
TCP: 53, 80, 135, 139, 443, 445
UDP: 67
TCP: 53, 80, 135, 139, 443, 445
UDP: 67
(All Ports)
TCP: 53, 80, 135, 139, 443, 445
UDP: 67
TCP: 53, 80, 135, 139, 443, 445
UDP: 67
(All Ports)
(All Ports)

Sensors
Sensors are a necessary component for modeling the generation of IDS alerts, and

these IDS sensors are represented as sensor objects in the model. Each sensor object is
created as an attribute of either a machine or a connector object, and multiple sensors can
exist on a machine or connector (through storing an array of sensor objects). These
sensors will essentially monitor what is occurring on a network device (connector or
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machine) and compare the activity’s “signature” to a database of alert signatures to
determine if an IDS alert should be generated. The database of alert signatures is one of
the inputs to the model, and a separate database is used for each sensor type.
A generic sensor class provides most of the functionality of the sensor objects.
The attributes of the sensor class include a unique ID, the type of the sensor, the output
location, an on/off toggle, an array of alerts produced, the available alert database to use,
and the network device that the sensor is placed on. This class also provides the
methodology for writing all of the generated alerts out to a text file. Two other classes, a
network sensor class and host sensor class, inherit from the sensor class to indicate the
specific application of the sensor. The network sensor class represents a NIDS, while the
host sensor class represents a HIDS.
NIDS refers to a network-based intrusion detection sensor. In a real network, this
type of sensor works by monitoring activity in the network traffic. Also, this type of
sensor is a physical device that must be somehow attached to a connector in order to
function. In some cases, the sensor will be attached just as a machine is typically
attached, and all of the network traffic will be sent to the sensor in addition to being sent
to the actual destination. Another method is to use a network tap, where one or more
specific Ethernet links are interrupted by a device that duplicates the traffic and sends the
duplicates to the sensor (Crothers, 2003). The model can be considered to use either of
these approaches. A sensor placed on a connector object will effectively monitor all of
the traffic that moves through the connector.
HIDS refers to a host-based intrusion detection sensor. This type of sensor exists
in a real network as software running on a machine that monitors the machine’s activity

73

logs. This type of sensor is typically not as reliable as a NIDS since the machine running
the software could be compromised during an attack, forfeiting the validity of the logs.
One of the advantages of a HIDS, though, is that fewer false alerts (false positives) will
be generated than with NIDS. Host based sensors accomplish this because only
successful actions will be reported in a system log (Crothers, 2003). The model takes this
trait into consideration also, and alerts are only generated by a sensor on a machine object
if the action triggering the alert is successful.
As briefly mentioned, the model mimics the generation of alerts through
signature-based detection. A signature represents a pattern found in one or more network
packets that can be matched to a particular type of activity. Intrusion detection sensors
focus specifically on malicious activity. The general approach of signature-based
detection is to look through network traffic (packets) and cross-reference the findings
with a library of signatures to find a match. If a signature match is found, the sensor
generates an alert, which is analogous to tripping an alarm. Each brand (or type) of sensor
has a unique library of signatures to compare network traffic with (Crothers, 2003). For
each default sensor type available, an available alerts object is created to act as a library
of signatures and alert messages. More information about the available alerts class will be
presented in chapter 7.
Currently, the only sensor type implemented in the model is Snort. Snort IDS
sensors are open source, and the organization offers all of the information necessary to
establish a separate library of the signatures and associated alert information. This
information is included in an alert definitions file that is used as one of the modeling
inputs (for the Snort sensors specifically). Additional sensors can easily be added to the
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list of available sensor types by providing both a name for the sensor and a file containing
the alert definitions to be used by the sensor. The preferences menu of the application
provides a means to add (or remove) sensor types.
6.5

Virtual Terrain
The virtual terrain XML document is essentially used to represent a detailed

network structure. This type of document can be created and used by the cyber attack
simulator presented in this thesis. A virtual terrain document can also be created by a
device known as a network scanner that scans a physical network and generates a XML
file document depicting the detected network topology and device details. The document
is intended to be used by INFERD and other information fusion tools as one of the inputs
in determining the progression (and threat) of an attack.
As mentioned previously, the VT interface package provides the functionality for
both reading and generating a virtual terrain document. This package relies on the use of
a publicly available package known as JDOM to both read and write the XML document.
When reading in a XML file, JDOM will parse all of the necessary XML tags and create
an object with appropriate elements and attributes. Also, when writing out a XML file,
JDOM will create the XML tags and structured formatting when provided with a set of
elements and attributes that make up the document.
Since this document is created and used by multiple applications, a common
schema is necessary to ensure that each application keeps the XML format consistent.
This schema, developed by Argauer (2007), is portrayed in Figure 6.11. The virtual
terrain element is considered the root element of the document, and all other elements
branch off of this root element.
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Figure 6.11: Virtual Terrain XML Schema
The VT parser class is responsible for importing and exporting XML documents.
One of the advantages of using an XML document is that the model does not need to use
all of the information included in the document. Only the elements and attributes
associated with desired network details are parsed by the VT parser class when reading in
the virtual terrain. For instance, the virtual terrain includes a structure for defining user
accounts and privileges within a network. However, the model does not contain or use
this information, so it is not considered when parsing a file.
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The first step in reading in a virtual terrain document is to create the network
object. If a name tag is provided, the network will use that name. Otherwise, the default
“virtual terrain” will be used. A connector object is created for each router element
defined in the document, and the appropriate firewall (port) permissions are included as
connector attributes. Next, machine objects are created for each host and host cluster
element defined in the document. Aside from basic attributes, the hosts and host clusters
also include service elements (and possibly a list of exploit elements for each service).
The machine objects created include each of the listed services as an attribute, even if the
service is not one of the defaults available in the simulator. The service objects created
will use the ports provided in the XML document for the port attribute. Also, if the XML
document defines a set of exploits associated with each service, the service object will
store these exploits, by vulnerability ID, as an attribute array that overrides the built in
exploits available through the service-to-vulnerability mapping. The sensors included in a
network are separate elements that have an ID in reference to a device in the network.
The reference ID is synonymous with the device (connector or machine) ID, and a sensor
object is created and added to the appropriate connector or machine object. Lastly, the
neighbors element of the XML document includes all of the links within the network (by
device ID), and the connector and machine (or subnet) objects are updated to contain the
appropriate links.
With a fully detailed network object in place, the following task is to draw the
network in the canvas. The methodology for drawing the network uses an algorithm that
specifies row and column variables that refer to specific increments of space vertically
and horizontally in the canvas. Each consecutive level of the network is created in a new
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row below any existing rows. Figure 6.12 illustrates a network read in from a virtual
terrain document and drawn in the network canvas.

Figure 6.12: Network Model Imported from Virtual Terrain
A network is exported to a virtual terrain document by first creating element and
attribute objects that represent the various network objects and attributes. These elements
and attributes are used by JDOM to write the XML document. The structure of the
document, indicating which elements belong to which other elements, is also defined
during the process. When writing the document, the VT parser class goes through all of
the devices within the network (connectors and machines) and creates the appropriate
elements and attributes for each object. The type of elements and attributes created while
exporting the network are the same as those parsed when importing a network from the
virtual terrain. A network structure created and exported to an XML document using the
simulator can be imported from the XML document to produce the same network
structure.
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7 Attack Simulation Methodology
After defining a detailed network structure using the components from the
network package, the network can be used as a basis for both setting up and simulating a
series of cyber attacks. The attack package provides the means for detailed attacks to be
specified and simulated in the application. The package also provides a major portion of
the functionality required to produce sensor alerts. This chapter discusses the
methodology used in providing network attacks and sensor alerts that are representative
of real cyber attacks and associated IDS alerts.
Since this thesis focuses on external-based attacks, the traffic entering and moving
through the network needs to be effectively modeled. Section 7.1 provides the details and
reasoning behind modeling the network traffic. Section 7.2 presents the database of
actions (or exploits) that is referenced when generating the network traffic.
The primary means for simulating a set of attacks over a period of time in the
modeled network is to establish an attack scenario for that network. Section 7.2 provides
the reasoning for using attack scenarios and the details contained in the scenario. Section
7.3 then explains the methodology used for modeling attacks and describes the attributes
of attacks.
When an attack scenario is fully defined, the application can then proceed to run a
discrete event simulation of the attacks progressing through the network and the sensors
generating alerts. This simulation process occurs through the handling of events, which is
discussed in section 7.4. The generation of simulation results, such as alert files, is
explained in section 7.5. Also, the event simulation process provides the option to
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generate an XML document containing the attack details for all of the attacks in a
scenario. Section 7.6 provides the details for generating this XML document.
7.1

Modeling Traffic
In a real computer network, the network traffic represents all of the packets

moving between devices in the network. Modeling all of the possible network traffic is a
tedious process that would also substantially reduce the performance of the simulation.
Also, modeling this traffic does not add any additional value to the simulation. Therefore,
the model only includes network traffic that is involved in the attack progression or the
intrusion detection processes.
The model is concerned with three types of network traffic: traffic associated with
an attack step (or action) that matches an alert definition, traffic associated with an attack
step that does not match an alert definition, and traffic that is not associated with an
attack step but still has an alert definition. The last type refers to noise (or false-positives)
that represent perfectly normal activity that can be mistaken as being malicious. Traffic
that is neither associated with an attack step nor has an alert definition is not modeled
because such traffic will not have an impact on the attacks or the IDS sensors.
The model uses traffic objects to define each traffic entity that moves between
network devices. These objects do not, however, represent individual packets. Instead,
the objects represent the set of packets required to perform a specific action. Representing
the traffic in this manner reduces the amount of information that must be routed between
the nodes of the network model. The primary attributes defined in the traffic class include
the source machine, target machine, action index, action category, and time created. The
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traffic class also includes a set of class variables that indicate the possible primary and
secondary categories for actions.
The source machine represents the machine that generates the traffic and indicates
the node in the network model that the traffic object is initially located at during the
simulation run. The destination machine represents the machine that the traffic’s action is
intended for. Upon reaching this destination node, the traffic is removed from the
simulation. The process used to route the traffic entity between these nodes is described
in section 7.4.
The action index is an integer that refers to the action that is being performed by
the traffic. This action could be a malicious step within an attack or just common noise.
The details of the action are contained in the available actions class and referenced by the
action index. Section 7.2 presents the details of the actions that are available in the model
and explain how the action index is used. Additionally, the traffic object includes the
action category to indicate what broad category the action is associated with.
The possible primary and secondary categories listed in the traffic class variables
represent the classification system used for the actions. This classification is
accomplished using a set of five primary categories that each has a subset of secondary
categories. The category breakdown is displayed in Figure 7.1. Each action performed
(and thus each traffic entity) is considered a member of one of the categories listed in this
figure.
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Figure 7.1: Breakdown of Action Categories
Although the traffic class defines a sufficient level of detail for generating
network traffic, the traffic class relies on two other subclasses to actually create traffic
objects. These two classes are the attack step and noise class, and each class inherits the
attributes and methods provided in the traffic class.
The attack step class specifically defines the traffic associated with an individual
step of an attack. For an attack step object, the action referenced represents an exploit
performed on the destination machine. An attack step object also includes some
additional attributes related to an overall attack. An attack attribute indicates the attack
object that the step belongs to. Also, a step number attribute indicates where the step
occurs in the progression of the attack. Lastly, a success attribute is a Boolean value that
indicates whether the attack step was successfully executed.
The noise class defines the traffic associated with typical non-malicious network
noise. This type of traffic will still generate IDS alerts, but the action referenced by a
noise object will represent a false-positive (where the action did not actually occur or did
not occur as part of an attack). The noise class does not define any additional attributes,
but the class does provide the methodology for generating random noise traffic.
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7.2

Available Actions
One of the key inputs to the model is the database of actions that are available to

be used in generating both attack steps and network noise. With respect to attack steps,
these actions represent potential exploits that can be used during an attack. With respect
to noise, though, these actions represent the potential set of false-positives that can be
selected from when generating noise objects.
The available actions class is an abstract class that specifically defines the list of
actions that can be used. This class includes attribute arrays to represent the attributes of
each action. A unique index, representing the position in an array, is used for each
individual action. Using this approach, any of the action’s attributes can be retrieved
through class methods when providing only the index. The application provides a table in
the preferences menu where the default available actions can be viewed. This portion of
the preferences menu is displayed in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2: Available Actions Displayed in Preferences Menu
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The attribute arrays established in the available actions class include the action,
primary category, secondary category, machine type, operating system, vulnerability ID,
protocol, and port number. These arrays are populated by a text file that lists all of the
default actions to be used in the application. This text file is loaded at the start of the
application.
The action attribute represents the actually activity performed. This attribute can
be considered synonymous with the signature, although the attribute does not represent
the specific hexadecimal packet signature. The action attribute is used both as the name
of the action and the attribute that IDS sensors look at when comparing network traffic to
a database of alert signatures.
The primary and secondary categories classify the action and indicate what type
of activity is being performed. This information is used when filtering out the list of
potential actions based on the desired category. Also, this information is used when
developing the progression of an attack through the use of stages, which is discussed in
section 7.4.3 and section 7.4.4.
The machine type, operating system, and vulnerability ID all indicate the type of
details necessary on the target machine in order for the action to be successful. For
instance, with respect to the machine type and operating system, some actions are only
possible on a server or on a machine using Windows 2000. Actions possible on multiple
machine types or operating systems must have an entry in the database for each type. The
vulnerability ID represents the specific vulnerability that the action can exploit, and this
attribute is used when mapping a machine’s services to the potential vulnerabilities
presented when using the services. Therefore, when provided with a set of services
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running on the target machine, a set of potentially successful actions can be retrieved
based on the vulnerability IDs.
The protocol and port number attributes indicate an alternative port that the action
can use. By default, the action will use one of the service ports of the service that is
associated with the action. The success of the action being performed by a traffic object,
though, will require that at least one of these service ports is allowed along the entire path
that the traffic object takes through the network.
7.3

Attack Scenario
The concept of an attack scenario is used in the model to clearly define what type

of activity occurs over the course of a simulation run. This activity includes both
threatening attacks and typical network noise. Each modeled network can contain a set of
attack scenarios that are defined specifically for the network; however, the simulation
only processes one selected scenario at a time. A specific panel is provided in the
network frames for managing a network’s attack scenarios. This panel is displayed in
Figure 7.3. With this panel, a user can select a scenario, create a scenario, edit a scenario,
or manage the list of scenarios, which includes removing or copying a scenario).
When creating a new scenario or editing an existing scenario, the user is presented
with a form where the scenario attributes can be modified. This form is shown in Figure
7.4. Each attack scenario object has a set of attributes pertaining to the noise generated by
the scenario and a set of attributes pertaining to the attacks included in the scenario.
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Figure 7.3: Attack Scenario Panel on Network Frame

Figure 7.4: Attack Scenario Form
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The noise traffic used in an attack scenario is generated during the simulation run.
This process substantially reduces the amount of information that needs to be stored in an
attack scenario. The generation of this noise is guided by a set of noise parameters, which
are attributes of the attack scenario. These parameters include the breakdown (as
percentages) of the categories of actions used in the noise and a rate at which the noise is
generated. The user can indicate which percentage (out of 100%) each of the five primary
action categories will account for in the noise generated. The reconnaissance field
provided in the form will auto-adjust so that all of the percentages sum to 100%. The
noise rate attribute (referred to as “alerts per hour” in the scenario form) represents
approximately how many noise objects will be generated per simulated hour. This rate is
exponentially distributed.
The scenario also consists of a set of attacks that will be performed during the
simulation. These attacks are defined prior to executing the simulation, and an attack
scenario can contain as many attacks as the user desires. The interface provided in the
attack scenario form (Figure 7.4) allows for attacks to be added to the scenario, edited, or
removed from the scenario. Also, the attack scenario included an attribute representing
how long (in simulated time) the simulation should continue to run after the attacks have
completed. Without this feature, the last traffic object would always be associated with an
attack step. Therefore, providing some additional simulation time allows for more noise
to possibly be generated and avoids the bias of having the simulation end with the last
attack step.
Another crucial attribute to the attack scenario, though not shown in the form, is
the random number generator. The scenario is provided with a rand lib object that is used
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to provide all of the random numbers used when initializing the scenario’s attacks. If
desired, this attribute allows for the same set of random numbers to be used each time the
attacks are initialized. This process will be further explained in section 7.4.2.
7.4

Attacks
The attack class is used to define individual (stand-alone) attacks that occur as

part of an attack scenario. An attack is considered to be directed at a specific target
machine with a certain goal action. The attack also encompasses the set of steps (or
individual exploits) performed in order to achieve the final goal action. A simple example
attack is portrayed in Figure 7.5. In this attack, the final goal is to install a backdoor on
the network’s seemingly secure internal file server. The outside hacker first performs
reconnaissance actions to scan the servers with direct external (internet) access. The
hacker then performs an intrusion step to gain access to the web server. From the web
server, the hacker performs an intrusion action and an escalation action in order to gain
root access to a machine in the internal subnet. With root access achieved, the attacker is
able to intrude into the file server and perform the final backdoor action.
The interface for adding an attack to an attack scenario offers two different
methods for specifying an attack. These methods include manually specifying the steps of
the attack or automatically generating the steps of the attack. If the user prefers to identify
each action used in the progression of an attack, then the manual attack setup can be
chosen. However, if the user is only interested in the final goal accomplished by the
attack and is not really concerned with the exact steps used to achieve the goal, then the
automatic attack setup can be chosen.
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Figure 7.5: Attack Progression Example
The attack class provides the attributes and methods used to create detailed attack
objects. Some of the important attributes defined in the attack class include the attack
type (manual or automatic), the attack name, the network used, the attack scenario that
the attack is included in, the final target machine, the final goal category, the steps in the
attack, the start time of the attack, the total time of the attack, an exponential option, an
efficiency parameter, a stealth parameter, and a skill parameter. The attack object stores
its steps as an array of attack step objects. Also, the attribute for the total time of the
attack will only be used if individual step times are not defined. The exponential option is
a Boolean attribute that indicate whether the total time of the attack (if defined) is
exponentially distributed around a value or uses a constant value. The three parameter
attributes (efficiency, stealth, and skill) are used when specifying an automatically
generated attack, and these parameters will be discussed in section 7.4.2.
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When adding a manual attack to a scenario or when editing a manually defined
attack, the user is presented with a form that stores the attack’s steps in a table. This
manual attack form is displayed in Figure 7.6. The table of steps displays all of the
attributes of the attack step objects used in the attack. This form also includes options to
indicate the attack name, how the attack’s time is determined, and when the attack
begins.

Figure 7.6: Manual Attack Form
Adding a new step or editing an existing step will trigger a new form to be
displayed that provides fields for specifying the attributes of the attack step. This attack
step form is shown in Figure 7.7. The form essentially allows for the traffic path, the
action used, and the time allotted for the attack to be defined.
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Figure 7.7: Attack Step Form
In the attack step form, the source IP and target IP fields indicate the IP address of
the source and destination machine for the attack step traffic, respectively. Based on the
source IP selected, the list of available IP addresses in the target IP field will be filtered to
represent only the machines that can be accessed from the machine represented by the
source IP. The action is selected by indicating the primary and secondary action
categories (the first two fields following the “Action” label) and then choosing from
available actions that match these categories. The secondary action category is not
required but helps narrow down the list of available actions. If the checkbox for filtering
out illogical actions is checked, the target machine selected (by referencing the target IP)
acts as another criterion for filtering out the list of actions that can be performed. Section
7.4.1 will explain the methodology for providing only logical actions (specifically,
exploits) for the attack steps. Lastly, the time allotted for the step can be specified as a
constant or exponentially distributed value. This step time indicates how much simulated
time will pass before the next step can be performed.
Setting up an automatically generated attack uses a different form that does not
include information about specific steps. The automatic attack form is displayed in Figure
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7.8. The form includes the same fields as the manual attack form for setting up the attack
name and the time-based information. However, the form includes a set of attack
parameters and goal options as a replacement for the individual attack steps. The
efficiency, stealth, and skill parameters are values that can be specified with a value
between 0 and 1. The meaning of each parameter will be discussed in section 7.4.2, but
the basic premise of these parameters is to broadly define the characteristics of the attack
steps to be generated. The target field indicates the final target machine of the attack
(selected by IP), and the goal type indicates what secondary goal category is to be used
for the final action performed in the attack.

Figure 7.8: Automatic Attack Form
All of the parameters defined in the automatic attack form provide enough
information for the attack steps of the attack to be automatically generated by the model.
Section 7.4.4 will present the methodology used by the model to generate the attack steps
from the auto-attack parameters.
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7.4.1

Logical Exploits
When specifying the attack steps that occur in an attack, the options available

need to reflect what type of activity is actually possible in the modeled network. Features
of the network’s device, such as services running and firewalls present on connectors,
will limit what type of traffic (and, thus, attack steps) can logically occur. Therefore, both
the interface for specifying the attack steps and the process for automatically generating
attack steps includes the methodology needed to ensure that the actions performed during
an attack represent logical exploits.
In the attack step form, this logic is provided by referring to both the attributes of
the target machine and the attributes of the connectors that are along the route from the
source machine to the target machine. With respect to the target machine, the attributes of
interest are the machine type, operating system, and services running. The list of
available actions provided in the form will be filtered to include only actions where the
machine type matches the target’s machine type, the operating system matches the
target’s operating system, and the vulnerability ID is included in the target machine’s
mapping of service IDs to vulnerability IDs. With respect to the connectors along the
route from the source to target machine, the attribute of interest is the firewall
permissions list. The available actions listed in the form will be further filtered to include
only actions that will not be blocked by the firewall permissions. This filtering is
performed by checking the ports used by the service associated with each action to ensure
that at least one of these service-based ports is allowed along the entire route from the
source to the target machine. If the associated service does not list any ports (for
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example, the “General” service), then the action’s alternate port information, provided
through the available actions class, is checked against the firewall permissions.
Although filtering out the illogical actions helps specify attack steps that will be
successful, this option can also be disregarded in order to display all actions. The user
may also want a specific attack step to include an action that will fail.
The process for generating noise also uses a similar approach for filtering out
illogical actions. The target machine of the noise object and the firewall permissions of
the connectors along the route from the source to the target machine will provide a means
for filtering what actions can be selected during the noise generation process.
7.4.2

Auto-Attack Parameters
The parameters included in specifying an automatic attack are used to guide the

generation of attack steps for the attack. These parameters include the efficiency, stealth,
and skill, and the parameters are intended to model the behavior of the hacker performing
the attack.
The efficiency refers to the directness of the attack. This parameter essentially
indicates how well the hacker can progress directly toward the final target. The available
values for the parameter are decimal values ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 representing a
very inefficient attack and 1 representing a highly efficient, direct attack. Figure 7.9
depicts two different types of attacks in the same network. The attack shown on the left
side of the figure represents a highly efficient attack, while the attack shown on the right
represents a somewhat inefficient attack. Appropriate efficiency parameter values for
these attacks could be 0.9 for the attack on the left and 0.4 for the attack on the right.
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Figure 7.9: Efficiency Example
The efficiency value is referenced during the auto-attack generation process when
attempting to progress down through the network toward the target. A random number
(between 0 and 1) is sampled from the attack scenario’s rand lib object and compared to
the efficiency value. If the efficiency is greater than the sampled value, the attack will
move to a lower level of the network or to the final target machine if the machine is on
the current level. Otherwise, the attack will move to a different machine at the same level.
The stealth refers to how well the attacker avoids intermediate goal steps.
Performing many goal steps in addition to the final target goal makes the overall attack
much easier for network administrators to notice and for IDSs to detect. Therefore,
minimizing the number of additional goal steps helps form a stealthy attack that is better
hidden within the network traffic. The stealth parameter also takes on a decimal value
between 0 and 1, with 0 representing a very detectable attack that performs goal steps at
every machine encountered and 1 representing a stealthy attack that only performs the
final goal. The stealth parameter is also checked against a sampled random number at
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certain points during the automatic attack generation to determine the category of an
attack step.
The skill refers to how successful the hacker is at performing the appropriate steps
throughout the progression of an attack. A skillful hacker will have retrieved sufficient
information about the network in order to perform actions that will be successful. An
unskilled hacker, though, will typically try a random assortment of attacking tools using
actions that may or may not succeed based on the details and security of the network. The
skill parameter represents the likelihood of the attack failing at some point (where the
final goal will not be achieved). The parameter’s value can be a decimal number ranging
from 0 to1, where 0 represents an attack that will likely fail and 1 represents an attack
that will likely succeed. A value of 1, though, does not strictly indicate that the attack will
definitely succeed. The network may be configured in such a manner that no exploit will
succeed against a particular machine. In this uncommon situation, even a perfectly skilled
hacker will not be able to perform a goal step on such a machine. In the automatic attack
generation process, the skill parameter (when compared to a sampled value) essentially
defines the difference between sampling from only the logical exploits (actions) and
sampling from all available actions when choosing an attack step’s specific action.
7.4.3

Guidance Template
One of the primary inputs to the automatic attack generation process is the

guidance template. The guidance template represents the graph-based template developed
by Holdender, Stotz, and Sudit (2005) to indicate what is required in defining the
progression of an attack. Refer back to section 4.1 for an explanation of what the
guidance template does. A text file is used to store both the stage precedence (for the ten
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stages shown in Figure 4.1 in section 4.1) and the action categories available at each
stage. The current (default) action categories for each stage are listed in Table 7.1
(indicating both the primary and secondary category).
Table 7.1: Action Categories in Guidance Template Stages
Stage
Stage 0
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Stage 5
Stage 6
Stage 7
Stage 8
Stage 9

Action Categories
Intrusion/Other, Reconnaissance/Enumeration, Reconnaissance/Footprinting,
Misc/Other
Intrusion/User, Intrusion/Other, Misc/Other
Escalation/Service, Escalation/Other
Intrusion/Root
Goal/Dos, Goal/Backdoor, Goal/Pilfering,
Intrusion/Other, Reconnaissance/Enumeration, Reconnaissance/Footprinting,
Misc/Other, Reconnaissance, Scanning
Intrusion/User, Intrusion/Other, Misc/Other
Escalation/Service, Escalation/Other
Intrusion/Root
Goal/Dos, Goal/Backdoor, Goal/Pilfering,

Stage 0 through stage 4 represent the attack progression used to accomplish
actions on a machine with external access, while stage 5 through stage 9 represent the
attack progression used to accomplish actions on machines in the internal portion of the
network. Since these two tasks have many similarities, stages 0 through 4 represent
nearly the same action categories as stages 5 through 9, respectively.
The guidance template class acts as an abstract class that stores both the list of
action categories per stage along with the precedence required in achieving each stage.
Either of these attributes can be retrieved from the guidance template class using the
value (index) of the stage. Since the guidance template class is populated through the use
of an input file, the model has some flexibility in that the user can alter either the stage
precedence or action categories in order to provide different (and possibly more specific)
attack progressions.

97

In performing the automatic attack generation, stage 0 will be used as the first
step of the attack since no other stages are accessible until this stage is completed. After
accomplishing an action from this stage, stages 1 through 4 are available. Stage 4,
though, will only be used if the stealth parameter allows (see section 7.4.4). Once the
attack’s steps begin targeting an internal machine, the attack generation process will
begin using stages 5 through 9. Stage 9, like stage 4, will only be used if the stealth
parameter allows; however, the final goal of the attack will also use stage 9.
7.4.4

Auto-Attack Methodology
The attack class includes a set of methods used to automatically generate the

attack steps used in the attack. These methods are invoked by the attack’s attack scenario
class immediately before the simulation run. The attack scenario class will sequentially
look through each attack included in the scenario to ensure that the attack’s steps have
been defined. If an attack does not have a set of steps defined, the automatic attack
generation methods will be called. The simulator provides an interface displaying details
about this process to the user. This interface is shown in Figure 7.10 (just after the attacks
have been initialized). The user has the option to use a common set of random numbers,
which will generate the same attacks each time, or a specific random number seed to start
with, which will essentially result in different attacks.
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Figure 7.10: Automatic Attack Generation Interface
A few preliminary steps are necessary before the attack steps can be generated.
First, the network must be checked to ensure that some point has external (internet)
access. Next, the attack scenario’s rand lib object resets the random number generation
stream with the same initial seed (for common random number) or a specified seed. This
stream is only reset once (before the first attack is processed). After the random number
stream is reset, the methodology proceeds through each attack individually. The final
target machine is located within the network and a critical path is created from the point
of external access to this target. This critical path is basically an array of connector
objects, and the array is formed by looking at each successive parent connection until a
connector is found that contains machines with external access. Figure 7.11 illustrates
this process. This critical path is used during the attack generation methodology when an
efficient route needs to be selected.
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Internet

Figure 7.11: Development of Critical Path
The generation of attack steps begins with the external (hacker) location and
progresses through the network eventually reaching the final target and goal. Therefore,
this process works in the same sequence in which a hacker would perform the attack.
Figure 7.12 displays the logic, as a process flow, used in generating both the external and
internal attack steps.
The attack generation will begin by locating an initial target that has external
access. An appropriate guidance template stage will be selected, and an attack step will
be generated using one of the possible action categories for the particular stage. The
attack class provides a specific method for generating an individual attack step when
providing certain arguments. These arguments include the source and target machine for
the step, the stage of the step, the action categories, and the step number. This method
will determine what specific set of actions (logical exploits in this case) are available
when considering the attributes of the target machine and the firewall permissions on
connectors located along the route from the source to the target machine. One of the
actions will be selected at random to be used in the attack step. If no actions are available,
a different action category (for the same stage) will be selected. If no actions are available
for any of the stage’s action categories, then a different target machine will be selected.
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Figure 7.12: Attack Step Generation Logic
Once an attack step is generated where the action successfully gains access to an
external machine, then the external portion of the attack is complete. The remainder of
the methodology focuses on internal attack steps (where the source machine is a machine
in the network). For each internal attack step generated, the logic will first check to
determine if the final target is on the same level as the current source machine. If the
target is on the same level, then the attack step will remain at that level of the network.
Otherwise, the efficiency value is referenced to determine if the attack step will choose a
target machine at the next (deeper) level of the network. Also, the efficiency value will be
referenced again in determining whether the critical path should be followed or whether
the step should branch out by selecting from target machines on a different connector. At
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this point, the appropriate guidance template stage is chosen and the attack step is
generated (in the same manner as defined in the external step generation). Depending on
the value of the stealth parameter, the guidance template stage selected may represent a
goal stage (stage 4 or stage 9 in the default guidance template), which will generate an
attack step performing an intermediate goal action. Also, the value of the skill parameter
will dictate whether a logical exploit is selected as the attack step action or whether a
random action will be chosen.
The internal attack steps will continue to be generated in the same fashion until
the final target machine becomes the target of an attack step. The next attack step
following this step will represent the final attack step of the attack and will include the
appropriate goal action.
7.5

Event Handling
The simulation package provided in the simulator is responsible for managing and

executing the set of events that make up a simulation run. This section presents more
details about the classes included in the simulation package and discusses the
methodology used to simulate an attack scenario.
The entity class is devised as an abstract class to represent any sort of transaction
moving through the network. In this application, the traffic class inherits from the entity
class and represents the only type of entity modeled. The node class is used as a generic
representation of network locations, and this class is a super-class of the network
hardware class. The node class includes methods that are triggered when entities enter or
leave the node. The entity class provides attributes indicating which the node the entity is
currently located at, which node the entity was at previously (if any), and which node the
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entity will move to next (if any). These attributes are needed when comparing to firewall
permissions used by the connector objects. Modeling the traffic as entities moving
between nodes in the network provides a more realistic approach in representing network
functionality and allows for networking decisions to be de-centralized at the network
nodes, where real networking decisions are made.
The task of implementing an attack scenario (through simulation) requires several
interactions between classes in both the simulation and attack package. Figure 7.13
displays the interactions between the simulation, event order, node, and entity classes of
the simulation package and the attack scenario and traffic classes of the attack package.
Each class is displayed in a block along with the key methods used by the class, and the

Implement

Route

type of interaction between two classes is displayed as a directed arrow.

Figure 7.13: Simulation Package Class Interactions

103

The simulation class is used to run the scenario (a simulation object is created as
an attribute of the attack scenario). This class includes a run method that manages the
simulation time and processes the events that make up the attack scenario. For each
event, a method in the entity class is called to process the event. This method, though, is
first overloaded in the traffic class to obtain the details of the traffic. In processing the
traffic, the appropriate entry and exit methods of the nodes involved are triggered. This
process includes routing the traffic through both machine and connector nodes. Also, if
sensors are located on any of the machines or connectors included, alert objects may be
generated that are associated with the traffic. For this entire process, both attack step
objects and noise objects are casted back into traffic objects to ensure that these different
types of network traffic are undistinguishable by the nodes that they pass through. This
method ensures that there is no bias in treating the noise objects or the attack step objects
since such traffic types would not be directly distinguishable in a real network.
The simulator uses a form of discrete event simulation to execute the attack
scenarios. An array of traffic objects, including the attack steps and noise, is used as the
event list for the simulation. This array of traffic objects is part of an event order class
which contains methods to add and remove events from the array. During the
initialization of a simulation run, a new event order object is created which contains an
empty array of traffic objects. A noise alert (if required) and the first attack step from
each attack in the scenario are placed in the event order array in order of increasing start
time.

Figure 7.14 presents the modeling logic used to manage the discrete event

simulation of an attack scenario.
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Figure 7.14: Discrete Event Simulation of an Attack Scenario
The simulation is executed by sequentially processing each traffic object (event)
contained in the event order array. The simulation time initially starts at 0, and the
simulation clock always jumps to the start time of the next event in the event table.
When the event is processed, two things may happen: first, the event’s traffic object may
cause sensors to generate alerts; secondly, the event may cause another event to be added
to the event table. For example, if the next event in the event table is an attack step, that
step may cause sensors to generate alerts. In addition, the completion of that attack step
allows the next step in the attack to be added to the event array. Events are processed in
the event array until there are no events left, which indicates that the simulation of the
attack scenario is complete.
When running an attack scenario, the user is presented with an interface
displaying the attack-based events accomplished during the simulation run. Figure 7.15
shows this interface. In a similar manner as with the automatic attack generation, the user
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can specify whether to use a common set of random numbers or a specific random
number seed. The random numbers are used in the event simulation when generating
noise objects and when identifying the specific start time of events added to the list of
events (primarily for traffic that uses an exponentially distributed start time).

Figure 7.15: Event Simulation Interface
7.6

Scenario Results
Upon completion of the attack scenario implementation, two primary outputs are

provided. These outputs include the scenario’s ground truth and the sensor alerts. When
these outputs are generated, the user is presented with an interface that allows the files
associated with the outputs to be viewed. Figure 7.16 displays this interface, including a
listing of one output file representing the ground truth and four output files representing
the sensor alerts.
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Figure 7.16: Scenario Results Interface
The ground truth output represents what malicious attack-based activity actually
occurs during the scenario implementation. This information basically corresponds with
what attack steps are generated and processed by the model. Having this information
available allows for both the placement of the sensors and the effectiveness of any
information fusion tool used to be evaluated. An example ground truth output file is
displayed in Figure 7.17. In this file, the attack steps are presented in order of occurrence.
The attributes listed include the attack that the step belonged to, the step number in the
attack, the action categories, the action name (or message), the path of the step
(indicating the source and destination IP), and an indication of whether the step was a
success or failure.
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Figure 7.17: Example Ground Truth File
The sensor alert output represents all of the alerts generated by the sensors during
the scenario implementation. This output includes alerts generated as a result of both
attack-based activity and noise activity. Individual alert objects are used to represent each
specific alert generated during the simulation run. These alert objects are created by a
network device’s sensor when a traffic object (entity) entering the node of that device has
an action signature that matches an alert signature in the sensor’s database of alert
signatures. The alert object is added to an array of alert objects stored as an attribute of
the sensor. This array is accessed at the end of the simulation when producing the output
files. Also, classes in the sensor management package, if the package is used, will access
this array throughout the simulation.
The output files for sensor alerts consist of one file for each sensor used in the
network. Each file contains a listing of alerts in the format used by the respective sensor
type. Figure 7.18 displays a set of alerts generated by a snort network-based intrusion
detection sensor. The alert messages are formatted in the same manner that real snort
alert messages are formatted. This message includes the time of detection, the port used,
the action/alert message, the classification of the alert, the ranked priority of the alert, the
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protocol used, and the source and destination IP address. The classification and priority
are used in determining the severity of a particular alert.

Figure 7.18: Example Sensor Alert File
The various sensor alert files generated are intended to represent the alerts of an
actual intrusion detection system. Therefore, the alerts produced provide no indication of
whether the alert was associated with an attack or just common network noise. The
purpose of these alert files is to supply information fusion tools with alert input that is
representative of real network alerts. These tools can then be evaluated using the
simulated alerts instead of requiring actual alert data to be obtained. Chapter 8 will
explain how this process is accomplished.
7.7

Exporting Attack Scenarios
Another potential output that the simulator can provide is a formatted XML

document depicting the attacks included in an attack scenario. An option is provided (in
the application’s preferences menu) to output such an XML document after the attack
generation process. This document includes relevant information about all of the attacks
in the scenario along with the full set of attack steps used in the attack. Figure 7.19 shows
the XML schema used for this XML document of attack information.
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Figure 7.19: Attack Scenario XML Schema
The process for generating this document is similar to the process used for
generating the virtual terrain XML document. The associated attack scenario object,
attack objects, and attack step objects are all used to generate the elements and attributes
included in generating the XML document. Also, this XML document can be imported
back into the network model (for the same network) to create an attack scenario with the
same attacks and attack steps. This process also provides a means for other applications
to set up a set of attacks to be generated in a specific network that is either modeled in the
simulator or stored in a virtual terrain document.
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8 Evaluation of Simulation Model
The final stage in providing a cyber attack simulation application is to evaluate
how well the application performs the functions intended. This chapter will provide a
formal verification and validation of the network and attack components used in the
model. A discussion of the model’s capabilities, limitations, and applications to other
related areas of research is also provided.
Both the network model and the attack simulation process need to be properly
assessed to ensure that they function according to the methodologies presented in
chapters 6 and 7. Section 8.1 discusses the techniques and experiments used to verify that
the network modeling features of the application properly define a detailed virtual
network. Similarly, section 8.2 discusses the techniques and experiments used to verify
that the attack generation process follows the guidance template and automatic attack
methodology and that the event simulation actually routes and processes entity events
appropriately through the modeled network.
Section 8.3 discusses the process for validating both the attacks and the alerts
generated using the model. The value of the output produced by this model relies strongly
on the attacks representing real cyber attacks in a network and the IDS alerts representing
real sensor alerts produced as a result of both attacks and network noise.
Following the discussion regarding verifying and validating the model, section 8.4
presents the overall capabilities of the model. These capabilities include what the model
can be used for as well as what the model can accept as input. Even though the model has
numerous capabilities, the model also has several limitations that can be seen as both a
barrier to providing more detailed and complex modeling and an indication of what
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features should be added to improve the model. Section 8.5 discusses these modeling
limitations.
Lastly, the model alone does not provide a significant amount of value to solving
problems in the cyber realm. Integration of this application with other applications, such
as information fusion tools, is necessary to make notable accomplishments in both
modeling and identifying cyber attacks. Section 8.6 indicates some of the other
applications that this cyber attack simulator is used with or is intended to be used with.
8.1

Verification of Network Model
The process of verifying the network modeling features involves demonstrating

that the results of using such features are the results that one would expect to see. The
modeled networks created using the simulator have several features that are directly
accessible to the user and several features within the classes that are indirectly used by
the model. The modeling features built into the class methods and indirectly accessed are
be verified through logical techniques, which are explained in section 8.1.1. The features
directly accessible to the user are verified through visually techniques as explained in
section 8.1.2.
The use of a specific network structure is helpful in performing both types of
verification. Figure 8.1 illustrates an example network that will be used to both logically
and visually demonstrate that the network model performs functions as intended. This
network includes two external-access servers connected to Router 1, a subnet of 100
machines connected to Router 2, and an administrator machine and internal file server
connected to Router 3.

112

Figure 8.1: Example Network Model for Verification
8.1.1

Logically Verified Features
Using a logical approach to verify that the model functions as designed involves

the implementation of conditional statements that will output either a specific attribute or
a determined value. Such statements are often temporarily used just for the purpose of
verification. Some of the model features that are logically verified include the parentchild connector setup, the implementation of subnets, the services stored on a machine
object, and the permission list stored on a connector object.
The parent and child relationships between connectors are necessary in
determining what “level” of the network a machine is on. Although a simple indication of
a connector’s child and parent connections can be verified visually, the actual array
values need to be checked to ensure that no redundancy or “ghost” connections exist. A
ghost connection represents a connection that had existed at some point and was either
changed or removed. To fully test the handling of connections, the network displayed in
Figure 8.1 is modified by removing Router 3 and adding Router 4 as a child of Router 2.
The machines initially connected with Router 3 are connected to Router 4. This new
setup is displayed in Figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2: Modified Network Connections
The proper handling of these changes is verified by outputting (essentially,
displaying string values) that indicate what is contained in the physical array. This output
is provided by a statement added to the model code (when viewing the connector’s form)
to loop through the items in the child connector arrays and produce a string for each item.
This same process is used to display the array of machines that are connected to the
connector as well. For Router 1 in the network, the statement indicates that Router 2 is
the only child connection and that the Web Server and Mail Server are the machines
connected. For Router 2 in the network, the statement indicates that Router 4 is the only
child connection and that 100 Subnet machines are connected to Router 2. Lastly, Router
4 has no child connections and has the Admin and File Server as connected machines.
Also, both of these machines indicate Router 4 as the parent connection. Therefore, this
experiment verifies that the process for handling parent and child connections works as
intended.
The use of subnets in the model is an important mechanism to group together a set
of machines and provide the ability to specify and edit the machine details collectively
instead of one-by-one. Since the machines are still represented using individual machine
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objects, though, the process of specifying and editing the details of all machine objects
included in the subnet needs to be verified. The association of a set of machine objects
with a subnet is implemented using a machine object’s group ID attribute. The use of this
attribute is verified by including a statement in the model code that tallies the number of
machine objects matching a particular group ID. For the model displayed in Figure 8.1,
the Subnet contains 100 machines, and 100 different machine objects are determined to
have a group ID with a value of 103 (which is the ID corresponding with the subnet).
Next, the consistency of the machine attributes across all machines represented in the
subnet is verified by changing some of the subnet details in the edit subnet form and
outputting the attributes of the machine objects through another statement in the model
code. The Subnet in Figure 8.1 is changed to contain the details shown in Table 8.1. Each
machine object associated with the subnet is verified as having these attributes through
observing the output of the added statement.
A key feature of the machine objects is the set of services included as an object
attribute. The form for specifying and editing the details of a machine allows for certain
services to be selected; however, the service attribute (an array) can also include services
not presented to the user. For instance, a Windows-based machine (such as Windows XP
or Windows 2000) will include a Windows service. Consider the Web Server and the File
Server machines displayed in Figure 8.1. The Web Server uses the Windows XP
operating system and is specified as using Web, ICMP, and FTP services. The File Server
uses a Linux operating system and is specified as using the TFTP, MySQL, Oracle, and
ICMP services. An additional statement is included in the model to retrieve and display
the array of services stored as attributes for both machines. This array of services is listed
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in Table 8.1. In addition to the services specified, the Web Server includes a Windows
service, the File Server includes a Linux Service, and both machines include a Generic
service. This list indicates that the set of both desired and default services are properly
allocated to a machine object.
Table 8.1: Services Included on Web Server and File Server
Web Server services
Generic
Web
ICMP
FTP
Windows

File Server services
Generic
TFTP
MySQL
Oracle
ICMP
Linux

A key feature of connector objects is the firewall permission list stored as an
attribute. This list indicates the port requirements for each possible path through the
connector. Although the set of ports for particular paths can be verified through the forms
provided in the application, the entire permissions list needs to be checked to ensure that
redundancies and bogus connection paths are not stored within this list. This type of
check is performed by including another statement in the model code (associated with
editing the connector) that loops through each entry in the permission list attribute to
display the connection path and set of ports. The connector used to demonstrate this
process is Router 3 from Figure 8.1. This connector is specified with the connector path
permissions displayed in Table 8.2. The statement added to the model verifies that these
are the only two entries in the firewall permission list. Another connection path is
possible from the Admin machine to the File Server machine (and vise versa), but this
connection is not restricted in any way and does not require a listing of ports.
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Table 8.2: Firewall Permission Specified for Router 2
Source
Router 1
Router 1
8.1.2

Destination
Admin
File Server

Allowed/Banned
Ports
Allowed
TCP: 80, 125, 1234
Allowed
TCP: 69, 118, 156, 1234, 1521

Visually Verified Features
Using visual aspects of the modeling process to verify the model features includes

both the display of attribute values and the graphical representation of model objects and
features through the interface provided. The model features that are visually verified
include the connection graphics, IP addresses, network saving process, and virtual terrain
exportation.
The connection graphics include both the blocks used to represent network
objects and the lines that display the connections between these objects in the drawing
canvas. The use of these graphics is verified by observing the appropriate connectionrelated attributes established for the objects (displayed in the forms available). For
example, when adding a connector (referred to as Router A) and machine (referred to as
Host A) to a network model, a line can be created in the canvas representing a connection
between Router A and Host B. This effectively sets Router A as the parent connection of
Host B. When adding another connector (Router B) to the model with the initial attribute
of having Router A as the parent connection, a line will be created in the canvas that
represents this connection. This feature is displayed in Figure 8.3. The creation of any
additional lines connected to the machine is prohibited since only one connection is
allowed. Also, if another connector is added to the model, the creation of lines that cause
a looping connection between the three connectors is prohibited to maintain the intended
tree structure of network topologies.
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Figure 8.3: Connection Graphics Example
Each of the IP addresses used as machine attributes needs to be uniquely defined
in the network model. When adding a machine to a network model, the IP address is
determined based on the connector that the machine is linked to and the next available
value for the fourth IP component. This process is verified using the network models
shown in Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2. For example, when the Admin machine is added to
Router 3 in Figure 8.1, the IP address of the machine becomes 192.168.3.1. The first two
components are specific to the network, while the third component represents the
connector ID (which is 3 for Router 3) and the next available value when considering the
other components (which is 1). When adding the File Server machine to the Router 3, the
IP address of that machine becomes 192.168.3.2. Similarly, when the Admin and File
Server machines are modified to be connected with Router 4 in Figure 8.2, the IP
addresses become 192.168.4.1 and 192.168.4.2, respectively. Additionally, when a subnet
of 10 machines is added to Router 4, the IP addresses for machines in this subnet range
from 192.168.4.3 through 192.168.4.12. These steps verify that the IP address is created
from the appropriate model criteria.
Saving the network is an important model feature that allows users to either view
the model or continue working on developing the model at a later point. In saving the
network model, though, all of the appropriate network details need to be stored and
retrieved properly for the model to be accurately recreated when loading the associated
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save file. This process is simply verified with the network model displayed in Figure 8.1
by identifying all of the details associated with the network, saving the network model,
reloading the model from the save file, and then observing the same details again.
Performing this task recreates the network with the same details as before, which include
the same objects, connections, and attributes. Thus, this process verifies the saving
operation provided.
Similar to saving a network, exporting the network to a virtual terrain XML
document also allows for the network model to be viewed and further developed at a later
point in time. In addition, this virtual terrain document allows for other applications to
generate models for the simulator and to use models generated by the simulator. The
process of exporting a modeled network to a virtual terrain document and importing a
modeled network from a virtual terrain document is verified using the same example
network shown in Figure 8.1. After first exporting and then importing the network’s
virtual terrain, the network model created is displayed in Figure 8.4. Although the
positions of the block components are different, the respective object attributes are the
same as before. This indicates that the virtual terrain is both properly exported and
imported.

Figure 8.4: Network Model Imported from Virtual Terrain
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8.2

Verification of Attack Simulation
Verifying that the attacks are both produced and simulated as intended is

necessary to ensure that results produced from a simulation run represent what is
designed to be produced based on the input provided by the user. This verification is
performed using six different experiments. The first experiment is designed to ensure that
the available set of exploits is filtered properly based on the attributes of the machines
and connectors involved in performing the exploit. This process is discussed in section
8.2.1. The second experiment traces the stages that an automatically generated attack
progresses through to verify that the guidance template is correctly followed. Section
8.2.2 provides a discussion of the experiment that verifies the use of the guidance
template. The third experiment evaluates the effects of the three automatic attack
parameters to verify that these parameters are used appropriately by the attack generation
process. This experiment is presented in section 8.2.3. The fourth experiment verifies that
entities are appropriately routed between the intended nodes of the network model, and
this experiment is described in section 8.2.4. The sixth experiment verifies that noise is
appropriately generated, and this experiment id described in section 8.2.5. The final
experiment compares the set of alerts generated by the sensors to the network traffic
processed during a simulation run to verify that the proper set of alerts are being
generated for specific sensors. Section 8.2.6 provides a discussion of this alert
verification process.
These different experiments all utilize the same network model. This network
model is developed using the model from Figure 8.1 as a basis, and this new model is
displayed in Figure 8.5. This model includes an additional network level as well as IDS
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sensors placed on Router 1, Router 3, Router 4, and the File Server. For ease of clarifying
the attack step targets used in the experiments, the IP address or IP range of each machine
in this network model is listed in Table 8.3

Figure 8.5: Example Network for Attack Verification
Table 8.3: IP Addresses Used in Example Network
Machine
Web Server
Mail Server
Subnet
Admin
File Server
Offices
8.2.1

IP Address or Range
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.2
192.168.2.1 – 192.168.2.100
192.168.3.1
192.168.3.2
192.168.4.1 – 192.168.4.20

Exploit Filtering
When setting up a manual attack step, filtering out illogical exploits is a very

beneficial feature. The results of this process must include only exploits that are possible
based on the attributes of the target machine and traffic path of the attack step. Verifying
that the correct exploits are provided involves checking the details of each exploit against
appropriate machine and connector attributes. An experiment is setup using the network
model displayed in Figure 8.5 to verify the exploit selection process.
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The experiment consists of setting up a manual attack step from the Web Server
(with an IP of 192.168.1.1) to the File Server (with an IP of 192.168.3.2) and observing
both the total set of exploits listed and the logical set of exploits listed as possible actions
for the attack. The details of the attack step are displayed in Figure 8.6. For the
Reconnaissance/Scanning action category, a fairly large list of potential exploits is
presented. However, when choosing the option to filter out illogical exploits, only eight
specific exploits are presented. These eight exploits correspond with the details of the
target machine. For example, the operating system required is Linux, the machine type
required is a server, and the vulnerability IDs of the exploits are associated with the
ICMP service. These three attributes match the attributes of the File Server machine
object. Also, the port associated with the ICMP service is allowed by the firewall
permissions along the path from the Web Server to the File Server. Therefore, the exploit
filtering performs as desired.

Figure 8.6: Attack Step Details
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8.2.2

Stage Progression
The process for automatically generating attack steps for an attack relies heavily

on the proper use of the guidance template. The guidance template limits controls what
stages need to precede which other stages, and the attacks generated using the simulator
need to demonstrate this stage precedence. An experiment was setup to test the
implementation of the guidance template using the network model displayed in Figure
8.5.
The stage progression experiment uses an attack scenario with nine separate
automatic attacks that have various efficiency values, stealth values, target machines, and
goal categories. The characteristics of each attack are listed in Table 8.4. These
characteristics are varied to account for the different complexities and situations that the
automatic attack generation process can encounter. The attacks are generated and
processed during the simulation run, and the resulting ground truth output is observed to
verify that the stage progression is appropriate.
Table 8.4: Attack Details for Stage Progression Experiment
Name
Attack 1
Attack 2
Attack 3
Attack 4
Attack 5
Attack 6
Attack 7
Attack 8
Attack 9

Efficiency
0.2
0.5
0.9
0.2
0.5
0.9
0.2
0.5
0.9

Stealth
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.2

Skill
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

Target
192.168.2.59
192.168.4.16
192.168.3.1
192.168.2.24
192.168.1.1
192.168.3.2
192.168.7.16
192.168.2.1
192.168.4.11

Goal Category
Espionage
DOS
Corruption
Pilfering
Backdoor
Backdoor
Espionage
Corruption
DOS

The ground truth indicates that the action categories and respective stages used in
each attack follow the correct guidance template progression. For example, Attack 2
consists of twelve actions that occur in a sequence that complies with the stage
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precedence defined in the guidance template class, and the actions are displayed in Table
8.5. This attack begins with a footprinting action (stage 0) and then an intrusion/other
action targeting the Web Server from an external location. With access gained to the web
server, the attack continues with misc/virus-trojan and reconnaissance/enumeration
actions that perform additional malicious activity against the Web Server and install
worms. These actions account for stage 5 of the guidance template progression. Next, an
intrusion/root (stage 6) action is performed against a machine in the Subnet group to gain
access to a Subnet machine. From this point, a reconnaissance/enumeration (stage 5)
action and escalation/service (stage 7) action are performed directed at the Admin
machine and gaining access to this machine. An escalation/service action is performed
again (internally) to gain additional access, and then another escalation/service action is
performed against a machine in the Offices group. Access is then gained to the attack’s
final target machine (192.168.4.16) with another escalation/service action. Finally, the
attack’s final goal is accomplished using a goal/dos (stage 9) action.
Table 8.5: Attacks Steps Generated for Attack 2
Step
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Step 9
Step 10
Step 11
Step 12

Action Category
Recon Footprinting
Intrusion Other
Misc VirusTrojan
Recon Enumeration
Misc VirusTrojan
Intrusion Root
Recon Enumeration
Escalation Service
Escalation Service
Escalation Service
Escalation Service
Goal Dos

Action
Path
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP
209.153.125.235 -> 192.168.1.1
SHELLCODE x86 stealth NOOP
212.97.19.144 -> 192.168.1.1
MISC ramen worm
192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.1
FINGER account enumeration attempt
192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.1
MISC ramen worm
192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.1
MS-SQL/SMB xp_showcolv possible buffer over 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.2.22
WEB-PHP read_body.php access attempt
192.168.2.22 -> 192.168.3.1
WEB-MISC changepw.exe access
192.168.2.22 -> 192.168.3.1
SMTP VRFY overflow attempt
192.168.3.1 -> 192.168.3.1
WEB-COLDFUSION CFUSION_VERIFYMAIL a 192.168.3.1 -> 192.168.4.8
SMTP RCPT TO overflow
192.168.4.8 -> 192.168.4.16
DDOS TFN client command BE
192.168.4.16 -> 192.168.4.16

The stages used by the actions performed in the attack are tracked to determine
the sequence that the stages occur in. This sequence is as follows: stage 0, stage 1, and
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stage 5 (three times), stage 8, stage 5, stage 7 (four times), and finally stage 9. This attack
sequence abides perfectly by the rules defined in the guidance template class.
8.2.3

Attack Parameters
The three automatic attack generation parameters are intended to provide a

significant level of control in generating the attacks simply by varying the parameter
values between 0 and 1. A separate experiment is performed to verify that each parameter
provides this level of control.
The efficiency parameter affects the directness and complexity of the attacks.
Highly efficient attacks are expected to consist of only a few steps that all follow a
critical path to the target, while highly inefficient attacks are expected to have many steps
that traverse across the network. The experiment performed to verify this outcome is
established using the network model shown in Figure 8.5 and consists of twenty attacks
using the same final target and goal category. For these attacks, the efficiency parameter
is varied between 0.05 and 1.0, while the other parameters remain at 1.0. With the
efficiency value as the only difference between the attacks, the number of steps and
complexity of the attacks can be used to determine the effectiveness of the parameter.
Ten replications of this scenario are used (with a different random seed for each
replication) to provide a sufficient amount of step-related data for each parameter value.
Figure 8.7 displays the number of steps generated for each of the ten replications across
all of the efficiency values used. A trend line is displayed to indicate the correlation of
the efficiency parameter with the number of steps.
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Efficiency Experiment Results
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Figure 8.7: Relationship between Efficiency and Number of Steps
The lower efficiency values are determined to significantly produce more attack
steps. The trend in Figure 8.7 indicates that experiment produces an 80.5% correlation
between the efficiency and the number of steps generated. Observation of the individual
attack progressions developed for each efficiency value also indicates that the attacks
using a low efficiency value have a more complex attack path than the attacks using a
high efficiency value. For example, nine out of ten replications of the attack associated
with an efficiency of 0.9 progress along the critical connector path to the final target (in
the Office group). However, six replications of the attack associated with an efficiency of
0.3 branch out to the Subnet group before advancing to machines connected to Router 3.
The number and complexity of attack steps produced for this experiment indicate that the
efficiency parameter has the appropriate effect in the automatic attack generation process.
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The stealth parameter affects how well intermediate goal steps are avoided during
the attack progression, and these steps are more likely to be produced when using a low
stealth value than when using a high stealth value. The experiment used to verify the
proper implementation of the stealth parameter also uses the network model in Figure
8.5. In a similar manner to the efficiency experiment, this experiment’s scenario consists
of twenty attacks where only the stealth parameter is varied (between 0.05 and 1.0). Also,
ten replications are run to provide a significant amount of data. The primary metric
within the attacks generated is the number of intermediate goal steps per attack. Figure
8.8 displays this metric across the different replications and stealth parameter values.
Stealth Experiment Results
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Figure 8.8: Relationship between Stealth and Number of Intermediate Goal Steps
Figure 8.8 illustrates that the lower stealth values overall produce a larger amount
of intermediate goal steps. However, the relationship between the stealth parameter and
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this metric does not fit well to any particular distribution. Still, though, the significance of
the parameter can be verified by comparing the results when using lower parameter
values with the results when using higher parameter values. For this comparison, a paired
t-test is performed comparing the number of goal steps produced using moderately low
stealth values (ranging from 0.1 through 0.3) with the number of goal steps produced
using moderately high stealth values (ranging from 0.7 through 0.9). The test indicates
with 99.9% confidence that results are significantly different.
The skill parameter affects how likely each attack is in succeeding. Highly skilled
attacks will typically be successful while unskilled attacks are likely to fail at some
particular point (step). This likeliness is verified with an experiment using the network
model in Figure 8.5 and an attack scenario of twenty attacks with different efficiencies
and targets. The experiment involves running ten replications of the attack scenario for
each of nine possible skill parameter values ranging from 0.1 through 0.9. The primary
metric of this experiment is the number of successful attacks (out of the twenty possible
attacks) in the attack scenario. Figure 8.9 displays a plot of this metric indicating the
number of completed attacks for each of the ninety simulation runs. A fitted curve
illustrates a fairly positive linear relationship between the skill parameter and the attack
success. The parameter, though, is not intended to strictly represent the probability of an
attack’s success. The skill value merely guides approximately how successful attacks are
relative to other skill values (more successful or less successful).
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Skill Experiment Results
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Figure 8.9: Relationship between Skill and Completed Attacks
For skill parameter, as well as the other parameters, will give varying results
depending on the network used. In the examples discussed in this section, the same exact
network setup is used for each experiment. However, different modeled networks may
cause the parameters to have differing relationships. For instance, a skill value of 0.6 in a
simple and fairly insecure network may result in the majority of attacks succeeding while
a skill value of 0.6 in a complex and secure network may lead to only a small percentage
of attacks succeeding. Similarly, an efficiency of 0.3 in a large and complex network
model will typically produce many more attack steps than the same efficiency used in a
small network model. The automatic attack parameters are intended to simply guide the
generation process rather than provide specific results, and differing values for these
parameters are effectively shown to establish different attacks when considering a
common network.
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8.2.4

Entity Routing
The routing of traffic entities between nodes within the modeled network is the

primary simulation-based feature of the simulator. This task represents the execution of
both attack steps and common false-positive noise activity. The task is also necessary to
determine the success of each action performed and trigger functions of the sensor
objects used in the model. An experiment is set up to demonstrate the proper
implementation of traffic routing, and the experiment is associated with tracking the
routing of an entire attack progression. Again, the experiment utilizes the network
illustrated in Figure 8.5.
The routing experiment involves an attack scenario with one automatically
generated attack that runs successfully to completion. For this experiment, both the entity
and node classes are temporarily modified to output information pertaining to the routing
process. Each time an entity enters or leaves a specific node, a string is displayed
indicating the action associated with the entity and the name of the node. This
information is used to verify that all of the attack steps of an attack are routed as expected
through the network. The source and destination of the steps generated for the attack are
displayed in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6: Routing Experiment Attack Steps
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Source
84.31.173.66
112.124.121.1
143.9.55.104
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.3.1
192.168.3.1
192.168.4.9
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Destination
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1
192.168.3.1
192.168.3.1
192.168.4.9
192.168.4.9

Simulating this attack in the network results in the routing paths depicted in Table
8.7. These routing paths are compared to the network display in Figure 8.5 to verify that
the correct node (connector/machine) links are used. For each attack step, the associated
traffic entity follows the appropriate path through the network topology. This experiment
therefore verifies that the traffic entities used in the simulation can logically move from
the source machine to the destination machine through the proper network nodes.
Table 8.7: Attack Scenario Routing Paths
Step (Entity #)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
8.2.5

Routing Path
External Æ Router 1 Æ 192.168.1.1
External Æ Router 1 Æ 192.168.1.1
External Æ Router 1 Æ 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1 Æ 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1 Æ 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.1 Æ Router 1 Æ Router 3 Æ 192.168.3.1
192.168.3.1 Æ 192.168.3.1
192.168.3.1 Æ Router 3 Æ Router 4 Æ 192.168.4.9
192.168.4.9 Æ 192.168.4.9

Noise Generation
The generation of noise activity is an important part of providing representative

network traffic that can trigger IDS alerts, and an experiment is performed to illustrate
that the noise activity is properly generated. The experiment is designed to illustrate both
the proper generation of noise traffic and the independence of the attack generation
process and the noise generation process. Essentially, the noise generation process should
not affect the set of attacks produced and executed during the simulation run. To test the
independence of these processes, two replications of an attack scenario are executed. The
first scenario replication does not include any noise generation, while the second scenario
replication generates approximately 500 noise activities per hour. 15% of this activity is
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associated with intrusion actions, while the remaining 85% is associated with
reconnaissance actions. Also, 95% of the noise activity is on the external portion of the
network. The attack scenario consists of three automatically generated attacks, and the
inputs for the three attacks are displayed in Table 8.8.
Table 8.8: Attack Parameters for First Experiment
Attack Efficiency Stealth
1
2
3

0.7
0.5
0.8

0.9
0.8
1.0

Skill

Target

Goal

1.0
0.8
1.0

192.168.2.23
192.168.3.2
192.168.4.16

Dos
Corruption
Espionage

Step
Time
4
3
3

Start
Time
0
21
33

Running the scenario without any noise results in six steps generated for the first
attack, four steps generated for the second attack, and six steps generated for the third
attack. All three attacks run successfully to completion, with a total scenario time of
0:50:49. When including the 500 noise activities per hour, the same exact steps are
generated for each of the attacks and the attacks are again successful. This process
generates the same results when repeated again using the common random number
option. These results demonstrate that the automatic attack generation and noise
generation are processed independently. Furthermore, 452 noise activities are properly
generated during the simulation run.
To verify that the parameters for setting up the noise work as intended, the same
scenario is replicated over ten runs (including the initial run) using different random
numbers. This process is used to demonstrate that the number of noise activities,
percentage of external noise, and action categories of the noise are appropriately
represented. Table 8.9 indicates the replication results with respect to these three metrics.
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Table 8.9: Noise Metrics over Ten Replications
Replication

# of Noise Activities

% External Noise

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Avg.

452
505
393
371
424
424
605
334
384
374
427

93.1%
94.7%
96.2%
95.4%
94.8%
92.2%
95.0%
92.8%
95.8%
94.7%
94.5%

% Reconnaissance
Actions
84.1%
85.0%
85.2%
86.5%
85.1%
83.0%
83.8%
84.4%
86.2%
86.6%
85.0%

The specified noise rate of 500 activities per hour suggests that approximately 425
noise activities should be generated during the 51-minute simulation run. Table 8.9
indicates that the ten replications produced an average of 427 noise activities, which is
very representative of the expected amount. Also, an average of 94.5% of the noise is
external-based and an average of exactly 85% of the noise is associated with
reconnaissance actions. These results verify that the noise-based parameters effectively
control the amount and type of noise produced.
8.2.6

Alert Generation
IDS alerts are generated during the simulation run as traffic entities move through

network nodes that have associated IDS sensors. The set of alerts generated for each
sensor become the primary outputs at the end of the simulation run. In order for accurate
alerts to be generated, the model must be able to identify the action signature associated
with the traffic and match the signature with the sensor’s alert database to determine
whether an alert is to be generated. An experiment is used to verify that these tasks are
performed as expected.
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The experiment for this verification procedure involves the same attack scenario
as is used for the routing experiment. Of the network devices involved in the attack
scenario, Router 1, Router 3, Router 4, and the Web Server all include IDS sensors. For
each attack step, the path is checked to determine if any of these four devices are along
the traffic path. For each device along the path, the IDS sensor output (after running the
simulation) is checked to verify that an alert is generated and that the alert corresponds
with the attack step’s action. Table 8.10 displays the action associated with each attack
step and the devices that produce alerts for this action.
Table 8.10: Attack Step Alerts
Attack Step
Action
SCAN cybercop os PA12 attempt
1
WEB-IIS .cnf access
2

5

WEB-CLIENT readme.eml download
attempt
BACKDOOR Infector 1.6 Server to
Client
INFO Connection Closed MSG from
Port 80

6

WEB-MISC changepw.exe access

3
4

7
8
9

WEB-PHP shoutbox.php directory
traversal attempt
DNS EXPLOIT named overflow
attempt
POLICY SMTP relaying denied

Sensor Alerts
Router 1 Sensor, Web Server Sensor
Router 1 Sensor, Web Server Sensor
Router 1 Sensor, Web Server Sensor
Web Server Sensor
Web Server Sensor
Web Server Sensor, Router 1 Sensor,
Router 3 Sensor
No alerts
Router 3 Sensor, Router 4 Sensor
No alerts

Attack steps seven and nine do not produce any associated alerts since there is no
sensor along the path of these steps. For all other steps, the appropriate sensors generate
alerts indicating that the correct action is being performed. Also, the difference between
the NIDSs and the HIDSs is verified by running the scenario again using a lower skill
value. With this modification, one of the attack steps targeting the Web Server fails to be
executed. The sensor associated with Router 1 still generates an alert indicating that the
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action was attempted, but the sensor associated with the Web Server does not generate an
alert since the action was not successfully executed.
8.3

Validation of Attacks and Alerts
In order to provide accurate alert output using the simulation model, the

generation of simulated attacks and sensor alerts must validly represent real network
attacks and sensor alerts, respectively. Ideally, the validation process involves comparing
the results of the simulator with the information available in a real network setup to check
for consistencies between the simulated results and the real network results. However,
such a real network setup needs to provide the a priori knowledge of the attacks that
occur along with the entire set of IDS alerts. Very few existing networks provide this
capability, and the networks that do provide this capability generally keep the results
proprietary. For these reasons, a different approach must be taken that involves logically
comparing the generated attacks and alerts to what is expected in a real network. The
remainder of this section will discuss how specific aspects of the simulation model are
validated as representing the corresponding real-network counterparts.
Providing a simulated form of communication between devices in the network is a
necessary component of validly representing attacks. The simulator models this
communication using traffic entities that represent a set of network packets associated
with one particular action (since actions can be spread across multiple packets). The same
representation is used for both attack-based actions and noise-based actions. During a
simulation, the traffic entities are routed through the appropriate nodes in the network
model in the same manner as the actual traffic would be routed through devices in a
physical network. Furthermore, the actions executed by the traffic entities are limited by
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the attributes of the target machine (such as the services and operating system) and the
permissions of the connectors involved. Limiting the traffic in this manner reflects how
real computer networks are not simply susceptible to just any action, but rather to actions
that correspond with the vulnerabilities in the computers and routing devices on the
network. Therefore, the network model is validated as providing representative traffic
entities and appropriate network details that effectively restrict the actions performed
with the traffic entities.
With respect to generating attacks, the auto-attack parameters and the Guidance
Template input allow for the attack generation process to produce the desired types of
attacks. Since the Guidance Template integration is verified as functioning as desired,
this input can be adjusted or updated to reflect either a more accurate or more detailed
attack stage progression. Using this approach, a subject matter expert can clearly define
the types of attacks possible with the simulator in order to ensure that only valid attacks
are generated. The current Guidance Template input uses stage progressions that are in
accordance with a graph-based stage precedence defined by subject matter experts.
Therefore, the model is valid with respect to the classification and precedence of attack
stages by subject matter experts, and the flexibility of the simulator’s Guidance Template
input allows for updated or more detailed attack stages to be specified when needed. The
maintenance of this Guidance Template input, though, is a necessary part of providing
both valid and up-to-date attacks using the simulator.
In a real network, the IDS sensors specifically are unable to discern between the
activities associated with an attack and the activities that are just common, non-malicious
network noise. This same feature of IDS sensors is mimicked within the simulation
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model. When either the attack steps or the noise activities are routed between nodes in the
network, the associated entities are cast into traffic entities. The traffic class used in this
model is the super-class of both the attack step and noise class; thus, a traffic object still
contains all of the necessary information to route the entities. Each IDS sensor triggers an
alert when a traffic entity entering the node containing the sensor is associated with an
alert signature in the respective sensor’s alert definitions database. For this whole
process, the IDS sensors are not provided with any indication of whether the entity is
associated with an attack or with noise. Therefore, the IDS sensor objects validly react to
the modeled network traffic in the same manner that a real IDS reacts to real network
traffic.
The alert output of the simulation model is intended to represent the real alerts
that would be generated when performing an attack scenario in an actual network. For
this reason, the alerts generated by modeled sensors must provide the same information
that is included in real sensor alerts. For snort alerts specifically, this information consists
of a timestamp, alert message, protocol, classification, priority ranking, and network path.
The alert definitions input used by the modeled snort sensors contains alert data compiled
using information from both the Snort website (www.snort.org) and the Skaion test
network alert data that contains real snort sensor alerts. Therefore, all of the same alert
information provided in real snort alerts is available for use by the simulated alerts.
Furthermore, the simulated snort alerts use the same message and output format used by
real alerts, allowing the simulated alerts to be handled in the same manner that real alerts
are handled. Additionally, the simulator provides an add-on (the sensor management
package) that can be used to limit the alerts output during a simulation run. This type of
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functionality can potentially be used in a real network where bandwidth and other
constraints force the network’s sensors to only output a portion of all of the alerts
produced. All of these alert generation considerations ensure that valid sensor alerts are
produced with the simulator.
8.4

Model Capabilities
The simulation model has many capabilities that address both the initial intentions

noted in the problem statement and other issues that have become of importance. The
primary capabilities of the model include modeling detailed networks and simulating
attack scenarios and intrusion detection systems within such networks. A competent user
is able to effectively make use of the modeling features, simulate desired attack
scenarios, and utilize the intrusion detection results. This section will discuss specific
capabilities that the model provides.
The simulation model allows for both large and complex networks to be easily
(and graphically) defined. Such networks can be many levels in depth and contain
subnets with hundreds of host machines. Figure 8.10 illustrates one such large network
model consisting of five network levels and over 1500 machines. The network modeling
functionality allows for each machine, connector, and subnet to have a unique set of
attributes along with IDS sensors that can easily be toggled on and off. Furthermore, the
connectors involved can define specific permissions for each unique connection path
between network devices. The network depicted in Figure 8.10 saves and loads quickly,
and the network details are also readily available when setting up an attack scenario.
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Figure 8.10: Large Network Modeled
The ability to import a network model from a virtual terrain document or export a
modeled network to a virtual terrain document is another useful capability of the
simulation model. This interaction with virtual terrain documents essentially allows
modeled networks to be used by external applications for a variety of means. Similarly,
networks intended to be used by the simulator can be defined in an external application
and imported. Regardless of external applications, the use of virtual terrain imports and
exports provides an alternative way to store modeled networks. Also, networks stored in
this manner can be loaded even when application-related changes are made to the
simulator. In such cases, the typical object files used to store network models may be
incompatible.
The guidance template input represents part of the flexibility provided by the
simulation model. While the guidance template is responsible for the attack generation
capabilities of the simulator, the guidance template can also be redefined in a variety of
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ways in order to change the requirements for attack progressions. Therefore, the guidance
template can be updated to reflect more detailed attack progressions and still be
compatible with the simulation model.
The attack modeling options are a major capability of the simulation model. The
user is able to specify individual attacks at various levels of detail. Very detailed attacks
can be created through indicating each action performed through the progression of the
attack. Broader attacks can be created by providing several attack parameters to reflect
the directness, stealth, and skill level of the hacker performing the attack. An entire attack
scenario can even be generated based on a set of parameters that include the attack rate
(in attacks per hour), average efficiency, standard deviation of the efficiency, average
attack length, and entire scenario length (minutes to run the scenario). The manual and
automated attacks have no specified size limits, so the number of steps that make up an
attack is essentially only limited by the processing capability of the machine running the
application or the patience of the user in setting up the attacks. For example, in setting up
an automatically generated attack in the network displayed in Figure 8.10 using a very
low efficiency value (0.005), an attack is generated with 2009 attack steps in a matter of
seconds. This attack is also simulated within the network in only a few seconds time. The
total size of the attack scenario (with respect to both number of attacks and steps) is also
unbounded within the simulation model. Using the automated attack scenario option, an
attack scenario is generated with 197 attacks ranging from 5 to 91 steps per attack. All of
these attacks are also generated and simulated within a matter of seconds. After either
manually specifying the attacks in a scenario or invoking the attack generation process on
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attacks in a scenario, the entire attack scenario can be stored as an XML file for later use
and observation.
In addition to modeling specific attacks and attack scenarios, the simulation
model is also capable of modeling noise traffic that occurs within the network. This noise
represents network activity that is not malicious in any way but can still cause false
positives (false alerts) when checked by IDS sensors. Since the majority of alerts
produced by a real IDS represent noise, the simulation model must be able to generate
and process a sufficient amount of noise traffic. An experiment is established to test the
limits of the noise generation process. This experiment consists of running the attack
scenario from the automated scenario generation example (with 197 attacks) along with
10,000 noise activities generated per hour with the category breakdown displayed in
Table 8.11. The total simulated time for the run is 84.5 minutes, and this scenario
processed to completion within about four actual minutes. Running the scenario with
noise takes significantly longer time due to the large number of alerts generated;
especially considering that the majority of noise activity occurs on the external portion of
the network where all three devices (Router 1, HTTP Server, and Mail External Server)
contain IDS sensors and generate alerts for each activity. For instance, the HTTP Server
alone generated 8055 alerts over the 84.5 simulated minutes. The alerts, though, are still
generated within a reasonable amount of time when considering the length and size of the
scenario and the volume of noise activity.
Table 8.11: Noise Activity Category Breakdown
Category
%

Recon.
70%

Intrusion
10%
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Escalation
10%

Goal
5%

Misc.
5%

The primary outputting capabilities of the simulation model include the IDS
sensor alerts and the scenario ground truth. The sensor alerts indicate what activity, both
malicious and noise-based, is detected during the simulation run. The simulation
produces a separate file of alerts for each active sensor placed in the modeled network.
These alert files are produced using a commonly accepted text-format for each alert, and
the model places no specific limits on the size of the alert files. This setup allows for all
of the alerts generated in a scenario to be easily organized, examined, and used as input to
other applications. The ground truth output created represents all of the actions performed
in the attack scenario that are associated with malicious activity. Providing this output
allows for comparisons to be made with the sensor alert output to determine which
activities failed to be detected by the IDS. This ground truth output can also be used in
other applications to compare with the sensor alerts for the same or alternate reasons.
8.5

Model Limitations
In spite of the many capabilities of the model, there are several limitations that

affect the use and applicability of the model. Many of the limitations do not directly
impact the validity of the model, but addressing these limitations can allow for more
detailed networks, attacks, and alerts to be modeled using the application presented. This
section will discuss aspects of the simulation model that are limited with respect to the
desired functionality, which include the connector modeling features, integrated sensor
types, auto-attack specification, and exploit and vulnerability database.
Although the network modeling features provide the user with a variety of
options, the representation of connectors is still fairly generic. The network model
represents a connector as a device that allows other connected devices to communicate.
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In reality, though, a variety of connector types exist (routers, hubs, switches, etc.), each
with a specific functionality. Therefore, the model is limited when constructing a network
model that represents a network consisting of a series of specific connector types and
functionalities. Also, one of the basic assumptions of the model is that specific malicious
activities do not move more than one connector level through the network at a time.
However, through the use of routers and other more functional connector types that can
determine the appropriate path through the network, such activity is easily capable in a
real network.
The current sensor input used in the model is also fairly limited. Snort IDS is the
only instantiated sensor type that can be added to a network device. Also, the
functionality of the Snort sensor is more specific to NIDSs than to HIDSs. Ideally,
though, the model should represent NIDSs and HIDSs as they really function. Currently,
the only functionality difference between the sensor classes is that HIDSs will not detect
failed actions while NIDSs will. However, genuine HIDSs also provide more specific
information about the action performed and the affect on the host that are not reflected in
the simulation model.
The simplicity of the automatic attack parameters provided illustrates another
manner in which the simulation model is limited. The generation of attacks using the
parameters only (exhaustively) accounts for a subset of the potential types of attacks that
are possible within the network. Also, some of the parameters result in an uncontrollable
degree of variability in the attacks generated. Having variability in the attack generation
process is necessary to reduce user bias and account for the alternative attack
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progressions, but the lack of control exhibited in this variability effectively reduces the
specific influence of each parameter.
Lastly, the database of exploits and vulnerability mappings used by the model is
hardly comprehensive when compared to the databases used by other cyber security
applications. Also, the addition of new exploits and vulnerability mappings is primarily a
manual process, which further illustrates the limitations of the model in keeping up-todate databases. Consequently, modeling newly identified attack types and new service
vulnerabilities is a challenging task with the current exploit and vulnerability mapping
infrastructure.
8.6

Applications
Although the cyber attack simulator is developed as a stand-alone simulation

model, the simulator has effectively been able to use input from or provide input for
several external applications. For instance, the virtual terrain document allows for
external applications to provide a network structure that can be created using the
simulator. Also, the alerts and ground truth data produced by the simulator can be used
by applications focused on processing sensor alerts in some manner. This section
discusses specific applications that can and have been used with the simulator, which
include the Nessus network scanning tool, the INFERD fusion tool and the VTAC
assessment tool.
Nessus (Tenable Network Security, 2007) is a network scanning tool that allows for
many of the details of a computer network to be obtained and stored. Recent research
efforts have included generating a virtual terrain XML file to store the network
information detected by Nessus. The network modeling capabilities of the simulator
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allow for these virtual terrain files to be easily visualized and modified. Thus, the
simulator can effectively depict a network that is scanned using Nessus. For example, the
Skaion test network (Skaion Corporation, 2007) is scanned using Nessus scanner and the
details are stored in a virtual terrain XML file. The XML file is imported into the
simulator, and the simulator graphically displays the Skaion test network with all of the
same features available as with a typical network generated with the simulator. Figure
8.11 displays the network model of the imported Skaion test network.

Figure 8.11: Skaion Test Network Imported into Simulator
INFERD is an information fusion tool that takes a set of sensor alert messages as
input and correlates the alert messages to form attack tracks that correspond with
potential attacks (Holender, Stotz, and Sudit, 2005). Although the intended application of
INFERD is correlating alert messages from real IDS sensors on a network, the
development of INFERD requires a generous amount of sample alert messages with
which to test the correlation features. Relying on a physical network for the sensor alert
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messages restricts INFERD to only demonstrating successful correlations with respect to
a small subset of potential network and attack types. The use of the simulator to provide
sensor alert data offers a wider range of possibilities with respect to the network structure
and attack types.
VTAC is the simplified name given to the Virtual Terrain Assisted Impact
Assessment for Cyber Attacks application. This application combines a network’s virtual
terrain file and a set of sensor alerts generated in the network to determine the associated
impact to the network. In this situation, the virtual terrain file indicates some crucial
machine attributes, such as the services running, importance, and operation criticality.
The sensor alert input for VTAC is then used to determine what actions can potentially
compromise a machine in the network, and the impact score is generated by comparing
this information with the virtual terrain information (Argauer, 2007). With respect to this
process, the Cyber Attack Simulator is used to generate sensor alerts for the network
specified in the virtual terrain. The simulator reads in the virtual terrain to build the
appropriate network model, and attack scenarios are specified with the desired targets and
goal types. For this application, the networks typically represented in the virtual terrain
and assessed by VTAC are not physical networks, so the simulator provides a quick way
to generate alert data which would otherwise require manually defining the exploits and
determining the alert correlations.
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9 Conclusions and Future Work
9.1

Conclusions
Accurate and detailed IDS sensor alert data is strongly desired in the cyber

security realm for the purposes of testing both awareness and response tools. The cyberattack simulator application developed over the course of this thesis provides a means for
quickly and efficiently generating representative alert data. The application also provides
the functionality to manipulate the virtual network representations, the cyber attacks
simulated, the sensor alerts output, and the a priori inputs. Overall, the application can be
viewed as a tool that effectively manages the entire process of simulating IDS sensor
alerts. Although this tool is not exhaustive in generating alert data, the tool provides a
sufficient underlying structure that can be easily built upon and improved to account for
the wide variety of potential alert data.
The application provides network modeling capabilities that allow for welldefined network representations to be created. These virtual networks include the
connectors and machines/subnets that actual networks consist of, and appropriate
attributes are given to these connectors and machines. For example, connectors include
firewall permissions that dictate what type of network communication can occur between
a specific source and destination within the network. Also, machines include attributes
such as the operating system, services running, and the machine type that are used to
determine the specific vulnerabilities for the machine. IDS sensors can be placed on both
the connectors and machines to properly monitor the network traffic flowing through
these network devices. The devices can be connected to form specific, organized levels
within the network that indicate how deep a machine is within the network topology (in
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other words, how many connector links separate the machine from the external network
portion). This level structure, in combination with the network device attributes, offers a
large variety of potential network topologies that can be produced with the application.
The application also provides attack modeling capabilities that are used to
generate detailed attack scenarios and simulate the individual attack actions within an
established network model. Additionally, the detection of such actions by sensors
produces alerts that can be manipulated and output as the primary simulation results. The
functionality for providing such capabilities includes modeling the network traffic
associated with attack actions, storing a set of attack actions for each attack and a set of
attacks for each attack scenario, and allowing for attacks to be generated through either a
manual process or an automated and parameterized process. This automated attack
generation process uses a series of parameters that give a user significant control over the
type of attack generated and the manner in which an attack progresses through the
network. This process also relies on the details of the network structure to ensure that
feasible attack progressions are produced.
The functionality of the network model and the attack simulation are verified and
validated through some different approaches. Several of the network modeling features,
including the connector level structure, subnet implementation, machine service
representation, and connector firewall permissions, are verified through the use of
conditional statements and temporary debugging output. Other network features are
visually (or graphically) verified through observation of the resulting network model.
Such features include the connection links, IP addresses, saving process, and virtual
terrain exportation. The attack simulation features are verified using a unique approach

148

for each feature. The proper exploit filtration is verified by observing the details of
individual exploits listed. The stage progressions produced in the automated attack
generation process are verified by observing scenario results and comparing the results to
the guidance template. The level of control provided by attack parameters is verified by
observing attack trends and other effects upon varying the parameters. The entity (traffic)
routing is verified by tracing the appropriate path through the network model. The noise
generation is verified by comparing noise results with the noise parameter values. Lastly,
the alert generation is verified by checking the sensor output against the specific attack
actions simulated. The validation of attack and alert generation process is performed by
evaluating the modeling capabilities with respect to the manner in which a real network
functions. The use of a common network traffic entity to represent both attack and noise
actions is a valid means of representing network communications and imitates the real
issue of not being able to clearly distinguish attack-related actions with typical noise
actions. The use of automated attack generation parameters allow for knowledgeable
users to easily sculpt a set of valid attacks to suite specific needs without the requirement
of defining each specific action. Also, the alert output produced through simulating an
attack scenario is validated as providing the same information as real alerts of the
corresponding sensor type.
The network model and attack simulation in combination give the overall
application a wide array of capabilities. Some of the key capabilities include the variety
of network configurations that can be modeled, the interactions with virtual terrain, the
flexibility of the guidance template input, the methodology provided for generating
attacks, the modeling of noise activity, and the generation of both IDS sensor alerts and
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attack scenario ground truth. However, the application also contains some limitations that
encourage the continued development and improvement of the application features.
These limitations consist of the generic representation of connecting devices, the lacking
set of default IDS sensor types, the simplicity and observed variability of the automated
attack parameters, and the primitive databases provided for exploit and vulnerability
information.
The use of the cyber attack simulator in collaboration with other applications and
related areas of research further demonstrates the capabilities and utility of this
application. The virtual terrain interactions and the simulated sensor alert and ground
truth output allow the application to work effectively with the Nessus network scanning
tool, the INFERD fusion tool, and the VTAC assessment tool. The network modeling
features allow for a virtual terrain generated with data from Nessus to be imported as a
new network model and treated just as a network model generated within the application.
The sensor alerts produced by the simulator are used by INFERD correlate attack actions,
and these results are compared with the simulator’s ground truth output to assess the
performance of INFERD. Also, both the virtual terrain and the sensor alert output are
used by VTAC to determine what impact particular actions have on a network.
In response to the initial problem statement of this thesis, the application
developed successfully portrays both the progression of attacks through a modeled
network and the generation of accurate IDS sensor alerts as a result of such attacks.
Network models and attack scenarios can be created and controlled with great detail.
Additionally, the attack scenarios can be easily run and modified. The sensor alerts
produced during a simulation run represent valid IDS sensor alerts that associated with
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the particular attack actions simulated. Also, the cyber attack simulator successfully
integrates with other applications and related research to fully utilize the network
modeling, attack simulation, and sensor alert generation features.
9.2

Future Work
The Cyber Attack Simulator developed in this thesis comprises several of the

accomplishments made toward modeling computer networks, cyber attack scenarios, and
IDS alerts. Overall, the simulator is a step forward in providing representative intrusion
detection data; however, the simulator alone does not complete this task. The application
itself has significant opportunity for both improvements to existing features and addition
of new features. Also, the inputs used by the simulator need to be either restructured or
properly maintained in order to provide the required and up-to-date information that the
simulator relies on. Section 9.2.1 discusses some of the recommended tasks in improving
the functionality of the simulator. Section 9.2.2 indicates the changes and updates that
can be made with respect to the various inputs.
9.2.1

Recommended Functionality Improvements
With respect to the network modeling functionality, a recommended improvement

is the use of more specific connector types. The existing representation of a connector
(through the connector class) is very generic. More specific subclasses of connecting
devices, such as hubs, routers, and switches, can be used in the model by simply
extending the connector class and inheriting the attributes and methods provided for
connector objects. In this situation, each specific connector class can contain additional
methods and attributes that reflect the particular functionality of the connector type.
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The sensors modeled within the network structure can also be improved by giving
the different sensor types more unique characteristics. For instance, actual network-based
and host-based IDS sensors operate and produce output in a different manner. Only a few
of the differences between the two types are depicted in the simulator, and the majority of
implemented sensor functionality represents network-based IDS sensors. By acquiring
both the type of information output by a host-based sensor and the alert definitions
associated with a specific host-based sensor brand, the network can be enhanced to more
accurately portray these sensor types.
With respect to the attack modeling features, the primary recommended feature to
add is the ability to model an internal attack. Although this thesis focuses on externalbased attacks, internal attacks are another growing threat to network security. Modeling
this type of attack is currently only possible in the manual attack specification process.
To integrate this type of attack into the automatic attack generation process, some
additional auto-attack attributes and machine selection processes need to be created.
The auto attack generation process can further be improved by the addition of
new attack parameters. While the efficiency, stealth, and skill parameters allow for a
significant level of control by the user, the actual attacks generated can still be fairly
unpredictable. Additional parameters can be made by either breaking down the current
three parameters into more specific sub-parameters, providing an additional standard
deviation parameter associated with one or more of the existing parameters, or by
identifying another feature of the attack progression that should be controlled.
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9.2.2

Adjustments to Inputs
Of the inputs used by the simulator, the most critical input is the array of exploits

needed in creating attacks. This database of exploits must be extensive and kept up-todate to generate attacks that are representative of modern hacker attacks. The model
currently uses about 2000 exploits of various types, but this array of exploits is far from
exhaustive and can be tedious to update. One possibility for improving this setup is to
synchronize the simulator’s exploit input with a well-maintained exploit database. Some
available

databases

include

ArachNIDS,

CVE,

and

BugTraq.

ArachNIDS

(www.whitehats.com) is a database of signatures and network-based intrusion detection
information, CVE (www.cve.mitre.org/cve) is short for Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures and associates exploits with service vulnerabilities, and BugTraq
(www.online.security.focus.com/bid) is a database of exploits that provides a unique ID
for each exploit (Crothers, 2003).
The set of available sensor types (or brands) to be used in the model is also an
important input. The modeling input currently only contains alert definitions for snort
sensors. Many other sensor types are available and frequently used in networks, though.
Such sensors include Dragon, IIS, and Apache IDS sensors. These additional sensor types
each tend to include specific alert signatures and detection capabilities not available in
other sensors. Providing the appropriate input for these sensor types and adjusting the
simulator’s output to match the sensors’ alert formats can improve the model’s
representation of a full-fledged intrusion detection system.
The guidance template input is another area for improvement. Although the input
is designed and integrated to allow for a variety of unique guidance templates to be
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defined, only one specific guidance template is provided and used in the simulator. The
current guidance template is also fairly lenient with respect to the types of stage
progressions that are possible. Additional research can therefore be performed to either
define multiple guidance templates with varying levels of specificity or maintain the
guidance template to appropriately represent attacks based on the views and findings of
subject matter experts.
The correlation of machine services with exploit vulnerabilities is an important
input that the model requires in filtering out the potential set of exploits. This thesis,
though, presents only the first implementation of this service to vulnerability mapping.
Therefore, the correlation input has significant room for improvement with respect to
both the types and the details (such as the vulnerability IDs and ports) of services defined.
The exploit databases mentioned previously, along with other resources as well, can help
identify other services and service-specific information that should be provided as an
input to the simulator.
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Appendix A: User Guide
This appendix provides an overview of how to use the Cyber Attack Simulator
application. An example network is created in which an attack scenario is setup and
executed. Section A.1 covers the basic principles of running and managing the
application. Section A.2 demonstrates how to construct a network model. Section A.3
explains how to setup attack scenarios within a modeled network. Lastly, section A.4
demonstrates the process of running a simulation and reviewing the results.
A.1 Running the Simulator
Prior to running the Cyber Attack Simulator, several needed input and preference
files

must

be

readily

ConnectorSettings.txt,

accessible

by

ListOfActions.txt,

the

application.

NoiseSettings.txt,

These

files

include

SensorSettings.txt,

ServiceSettings.txt, SnortAlertDefs.txt, VulnerabilityMapping.txt, XMLSettings.txt, and
GuidanceTemplateXML.xml, and the files should be located in the “config” folder within
the application’s directory.
Figure A.1 displays the common directory layout for the Cyber Attack Simulator.
The application itself is stored in an executable .jar file. The application, though, also
requires the jdom.jar file to provide XML input and output functions. Therefore, the
application is best opened by using the Run.bat file located within the application’s
directory. This file basically executes a command prompt that includes jdom.jar when
running CyberAttackSimulator.jar.
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Figure A.1: Running the Application
Upon opening the application, the user is presented with the window displayed in
Figure A.2. Only two menus are initially available, the File menu and Help menu. The
File menu includes options to create, open, or import a network, modify the application
preferences, or exit the application.

Figure A.2: Application Window
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When selecting the “Preferences” option, a tabbed menu of the various default
settings and inputs for the application is displayed. This menu is displayed in Figure A.3.
The menu allows for the database of available actions to be viewed, the available sensor
types to be setup and viewed, the default machine services to be specified, the default
connector configurations to be specified, the default noise parameters to be specified, and
the XML input and output options to be configured.

Figure A.3: Preferences Menu
A.2 Building a Network
This section walks through the process of constructing an example network.
Individuals reading this user guide should follow along with the process outlined in this
and successive sections.
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The first step in creating a network is to choose the “Create Network” option from
the File menu. This option invokes a window to appear, as displayed in Figure A.4, in
which the basic network details are setup. Enter “My Network” as the network name and
press the create button. The application window now displays a network window, a
toolbar of network-building buttons, and several other menus. The network window is
where the graphical representation of the created network is displayed. The toolbar
buttons invoke other menus to appear, and this toolbar can be dragged around to form a
separate window.

Figure A.4: Create Network Form

Figure A.5: Network Window
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A connector is added to this network by clicking the “Create Connector” toolbar
button highlighted in Figure A.6. This button invokes the “Create Connector Form”
displayed in Figure A.7. In this form, enter “Router A” as the connector name, select the
“Snort” option from the IDS combo-box, and click “Create”. When the form closes, a
new connector block is added to the network window that graphically represents the
connector specified.

Figure A.6: Create Connector Button

Figure A.7: Create Connector Form
Similarly, a machine is added by selecting the “Create Machine” toolbar button
indicated in Figure A.8. This button invokes the “Create Machine Form” displayed in
Figure A.9. In this form, enter “HTTP Server” as the machine name, select “Router A” as
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the connector, indicate that external access is true, select “Server” as the machine type,
select “Snort” as the IDS sensor, select “Windows XP” as the operating system, and
select the “Services” button to open the service options menu. In the services menu,
select the “Web”, “SSH”, “ICMP”, and “Apache” options and click the “Save” button.
This option returns the view to the create machine form, at which point the “Save” button
can be pressed to create the specified machine.

Figure A.8: Create Machine Button

Figure A.9: Create Machine Form
In addition to the connector block, a machine block is created in the network
window that is connected directly with “Router A” as displayed in Figure A.10. These
blocks can be dragged around as desired while still maintaining the connection.
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Figure A.10: Network View
To illustrate the manual connection process, create another connector named
“Router B” with the same attributes as “Router A”. This connector will appear in the
network without any existing connections, as displayed in Figure A.11. Select the “Create
Connection” toolbar button that is indicated in Figure A.12 to enable the connection
drawing mode.

Figure A.11: Additional Connector

Figure A.12: Create Connection Button
In this mode, clicking on the desired child connector and then the parent
connector establishes the appropriate child-parent relationship between the two
connectors. Click on “Router B” and then on “Router A”. This action results in a
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connection drawn as displayed in Figure A.13 and indicates that “Router B” is a child
connector of “Router A”.

Figure A.13: Making a Connection
A whole subnet of machines is added to a network model by selecting the “Add
Subnet” toolbar button indicated in Figure A.14. This action presents the window
displayed in Figure A.15 to input the size of the subnet. Indicate “12” as the value and
select the “Create” button.

Figure A.14: Create Subnet Button

Figure A.15: Subnet Size Form
The next window displayed is the “Create Subnet Form”, which is displayed in
Figure A.16. In this form, indicate “Staff” as the machine name. This name will be used
for all machines within the subnet. Next, select “Router B” as the connector, indicate that
the external access is false, select “Host” as the machine type, select “none” as the IDS
sensor, and select “Windows XP” as the operating system. The services can be left at the
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default values. Select the “Create” button to close the form and display a new subnet
block in the network model. Figure A.17 shows that the “Staff” subnet includes a
connection drawn to “Router B”, which represents a connection from each machine in the
subnet with “Router B”.

Figure A.16: Create Subnet Form

Figure A.17: Network with Subnet
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Now that the basic principles of setting up a network structure have been covered,
try adding additional network devices to create the network topology depicted in Figure
A.18. The specific details of the devices are not important at this point. If a mistake is
made in making a connection, use the “Delete Connection” toolbar button highlighted in
Figure A.19 after selecting the child connector (or machine) of the connection.

Figure A.18: Example Network Model

Figure A.19: Delete Connection Button
The created network structure can be saved by selecting either the “Save” or
“Export Network…” option from the File Menu. The “Save” option will save the network
as an object file (.obj) that can only be properly viewed with the Cyber Attack Simulator.
The “Export Network…” option will save the network as a virtual terrain XML document
that can be used by other applications and also imported back into this application with
most of the initially defined details intact. The graphical placement of the devices will
most likely be different, though.

167

A.3 Creating Attack Scenarios
Attack scenarios are created and managed in a modeled network using the attack
scenario panel located at the bottom of the network window and indicated in Figure A.20.

Figure A.20: Attack Scenario Panel
A new attack scenario is created by selecting the “Create Scenario” button in this
panel. This action brings up an option window, displayed in Figure A.21, that allows for
the type of scenario to be specified. Select “Manual” to indicate that the scenario’s
attacks will be specified separately.

Figure A.21: Scenario Options
The manual option brings up the “Create Attack Scenario” form displayed in
Figure A.22. This form includes a section to specify noise parameters and a section to
specify attacks. Enter “My Scenario” as the scenario name and also enter “15” for the
intrusion noise percentage. The reconnaissance percentage adjusts to 85. Additionally,
enter “200” as the number of alerts per hour and “2” as the number of minutes to run the
scenario after the attacks complete. Next, select the “Add Attack” button to add a new
attack to this scenario.
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Figure A.22: Create Scenario Form
Adding a new attack will first invoke an option window, displayed in Figure
A.23, where the type of attack is selected. Select the “Manual” button to proceed with a
manual attack where the individual steps are specified.

Figure A.23: Attack Options
The resulting “Setup Manual Attack” form is displayed in Figure A.24. Enter
“Attack A” as the attack name, select the option to use individual attack times, and
indicate “3” as the time (in minutes) to delay the attack. Individual attack steps are added
to the form’s step table by clicking the “Add Step” button.
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Figure A.24: Manual Attack Form
The “Add Step” button opens the “Attack Step” form where the detailed step
information is specified. Ensure that the “Filter out illogical actions” option is selected
and choose “External” as the source IP and “192.168.1.2” as the target IP. This target IP
represents the “HTTP Server” within the “My Network” network model. Next, select
“Recon” and “Scanning” as the primary and secondary action category to filter out the
list of available actions. Select “ICMP PING Windows” as the action performed in this
attack step. Lastly, indicate a constant step time of “1” and click the “Add Step” button.

Figure A.25: Attack Step Form
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This specified attack step is added to the list of attacks in the “Setup Manual
Attack” form. Add a few additional attack steps similar to the list of steps displayed in
Figure A.26. Select “Save Attack” on the “Setup Manual Attack” form to add the attack
to the scenario and return to the “Create Attack Scenario” form.

Figure A.26: Manual Attack Form with Attack Steps
From the “Create Attack Scenario” form, select the “Add Attack” button again.
This time, though, choose to create an “Automated” attack. This option opens the “Setup
Automatic Attack” form displayed in Figure A.27. In this form, enter “Attack B” as the
attack name, “0.6” as the efficiency, “0.8” as the stealth, and “1.0” as the skill. Select
“192.168.2.8” as the target machine. This represents the eighth machine in the “Staff”
subnet. Also, select “Dos” (Denial of Service) as the goal type. Enter a total attack time
of “15” and a start time of “10”. Click the “Save Attack” button to add this attack to the
scenario and return to the “Create Attack Scenario” form. This form now displays both
“Attack A” and “Attack B”, as illustrated in Figure A.28.

171

Figure A.27: Automatic Attack Form

Figure A.28: Attack Scenario Form with Attacks
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Press the “Set Scenario” button to make this attack scenario the active scenario
for the network. This network can also be edited later if needed by selecting the “Edit
Scenario” button in the network window. The “Manage Scenarios” button in the network
window allows for individual scenarios to be copied or deleted.
A.4 Running a Simulation
After an attack scenario has been specified and set as the active scenario for the
network, the scenario can be run (simulated) by selecting the “Run Simulation” toolbar
button highlighted in Figure A.29.

Figure A.29: Network with Attack Scenario
In running an attack scenario, an option window (Figure A.30) is first displayed
that allows the scenario to be run interactively or to simply proceed to the results.
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Running directly to the results uses default simulation options. Select “Interactively”
from this window.

Figure A.30: Attack Generation Display
An interface is provided that consists of three sections (tabs). The first section is
displayed in Figure A.31 and represents the process of initializing attacks and generating
the automated attacks. Press the “Initialize Attacks” button to perform this process. Click
the “Next >” button when the messages box indicates that the initialization is complete.

Figure A.31: Attack Generation Display
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The next section represents the actual scenario implementation where the attack
and noise actions are simulated through the network model. This section is displayed in
Figure A.32. Press the “Run Scenario” button to begin the simulation. Attack-based
actions are displayed in the messages box. Upon completion of the scenario, click the
“Next >” button to proceed to the final section.

Figure A.32: Scenario Implementation Display
The final section in the simulation interface includes the results of the simulation
run. This section is displayed in Figure A.33 and includes a listing of the ground truth file
and sensor alert files output by the application. Each file can be individually viewed (as a
text file in Notepad) by selecting the file and clicking the “View Result” button.
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Figure A.33: Scenario Results Display
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Appendix B: Software CD
This thesis includes a CD containing the software developed over the course of
this research and any dependencies this software has. The CD contains these primary
folders:
•

CAS Source – The complete source code for the Cyber Attack Simulator. This
includes all classes for the six packages and all images used in the user interface.

•

CAS Executable – An executable version of the Cyber Attack Simulator that can
be run on any machine supporting java. A Windows-based java runtime
environment is also included to allow the simulator to run with the same java
virtual machine as it was tested with. Also, the JDOM library is included with the
executable file as it is a dependency for working with XML. An example network
is provided that can be opened with the Cyber Attack Simulator.
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